

Anexo 1

Sam Pope Brewer



Undercover Press

By SAM POPE BREWER

MADRID. PABLO put a copy of the Falange newspaper *Arriba* on the cafe table. He said casually, but keeping his voice low: "I'll leave that when I go out. There is a paper folded inside for you."

When I returned to the privacy of my home I found folded inside the newspaper a single six-by-eight-inch printed sheet of Republican opinion critical of Generalissimo Francisco Franco's regime.

The picturesque underground press, the only means by which Spaniards can express their political ideas freely these days, has lately fallen on bad times and in recent weeks has almost disappeared from circulation. A series of police raids has rounded up many editors and frightened others into inactivity.

Even possession of a single copy of an underground paper is considered proof that the possessor is part of the organization distributing it. And distribution of printed matter hostile to the Government is

Ever since Generalissimo Franco became dictator of Spain, there has been a wide range of underground newspapers—Communist, Socialist, monarchist and anarchist. Most of them appear for a few issues and then vanish, usually when an editor or a printer is apprehended.

The newspaper with the most regular circulation and longest history probably is the Communists' *Mundo Obrero* (Workers' World). When its staff is caught a new one pops up elsewhere. For many months *Mundo Obrero* has not appeared in Madrid, but an edition printed in Galicia, northwestern Spain, appears here periodically. Another raid disposed of the staff which had been putting out the monarchists' *El Barrendero* (The Streetcleaner), a newspaper well known for its satire.

THE police, unable to identify the editors of *Demócrata*, rounded up all they could find of the members of the

"Prensa encubierta", artículo de Brewer publicado en la *Sunday Magazine* el 24 de agosto de 1947, sobre la prensa de oposición clandestina en España: "Pablo puso una copia del diario falangista *Arriba* sobre la mesa del café. Dijo en un tono casual, pero manteniendo la voz baja: 'Dejaré eso cuando me vaya. Dentro hay un papel doblado para ti.'

Cuando volví a la privacidad de mi hogar encontré dentro del diario una sola hoja impresa de seis por ocho pulgadas, con opiniones republicanas críticas con el régimen del generalísimo Franco."

"España castiga a obreros de Barcelona; empresarios obligados a recortar paga a huelguistas". Este artículo, publicado en la primera plana del *Times* el 15 de marzo de 1951, fue uno de los que causaron la revocación del permiso de corresponsal de Brewer.

Spain Punishes Barcelona Labor; Employers Told to Dock Strikers

Anexo 2

Camille Cianfarrá

3 Wounded in Madrid Clash Of Students and Falangists

By CAMILLE M. CIANFARRA

Special to The New York Times

MADRID, Feb. 9.—The feud between Madrid University students and Falange party took a turn for the worse today. Shots were fired and three were wounded when an estimated

total of 700 students encountered a group of Falangists.

One of the wounded, identified as a member of the so-called Franco Guard, which is composed of Falangists picked for their toughness, was reported in grave condition.

Hundreds of policemen were rushed on trucks and jeeps to the scene of the fighting. They sprayed the demonstrators with water from a tank-car and blocked all near-by streets. They arrested dozens of the fleeing students.

The view of responsible Spaniards was that today's incidents, which followed several other clashes in the last few days, were politically serious. In their opinion, the Falange party has become unpopular among youth, which they said no longer wanted to recognize the party's political leadership.

They pointed out that the Government could not countenance that development. They said it would implicitly mean failure of the regime to forge a new generation in accordance with the ideology that justifies the existence of the Falange party as the official political organization.

Red Propaganda Charged

The Government, in an editorial published in *Arriba*, a major organ of the Falange party, attributed the student

"3 heridos en enfrentamientos entre estudiantes y falangistas en Madrid", artículo aparecido en la primera plana del NYT del 10 de febrero de 1956. La cobertura de este acontecimiento le valió a Cianfarrá una amenaza de expulsión.

MADRID JUBILANT OVER U. N. ENTRY

Ruling Group Sees Franco's Vindication — Other New Members Are Gratified

Special to The New York Times

MADRID, Dec. 15.—Members of the ruling class here today called Spain's admission to the United Nations the Franco regime's greatest foreign policy triumph since the military and economic agreements with the United States were signed in September, 1953.

The official feeling of satisfaction at what is taken here as a vindication of this anti-Communist and military dictatorship and all it stands for was reflected in editorials of the Government-controlled press.

Every newspaper recalled with obvious relish that in December, 1946, the General Assembly recommended the withdrawal of the chiefs of all diplomatic missions from Spain, which, it said, was a "threat to peace." At that time the United Nations resolution was intended as a diplomatic boycott of Spain to censure the pro-Axis and anti-Allied attitude of its totalitarian government during World War II.

Spanish officialdom now asserts that yesterday's Security Council decision not only wipes out what Madrid considered an "injustice and an affront" but, in the words of the editorialists, proves that Spain was right all along and that it took the United Nations nine years to realize that it had been wrong in promoting an anti-Spanish policy.

As could be expected, critics of the regime received the United Nations decision with misgivings because they regarded it as an implicit endorsement of the Spanish dictatorship.

Izquierda: "Madrid jubiloso por entrada en la ONU". Todos los corresponsales del Times informaban sobre la desinformación del régimen, que convertía cada victoria diplomática en una reafirmación de las convicciones de Franco.

The New York Times


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Anexo 3

Herbert Matthews y Benjamin Welles

Anexo 4

Los Pactos de Madrid



The New York Times Sept. 27, 1953
TREATY SIGNED FOR BASES IN SPAIN: Cities denoted by symbols were reported to be those where facilities under the United States defense pact would be set up.

Arriba: "España firma acuerdo dando a los EEUU utilización de bases militares". La edición del Times del 27 de setiembre de 1953 contenía toda la información necesaria para que el lector entendiera la naturaleza de los pactos, desde mapas con la ubicación de las futuras bases hasta el texto "completo" del acuerdo.

Derecha: "¿Cuál es el precio del nuevo pacto?" El artículo de Hanson Baldwin analizando los acuerdos fue publicado el 29 de setiembre. El periodista hacía alusión a cláusulas secretas: "Los compromisos que los EEUU han asumido a cambio de utilizar unas bases no especificadas no están explicados claramente en ninguno de los documentos publicados, y las obligaciones de ambos países en caso de guerra real aparentemente sólo se mencionan en codicilos secretos."

SPAIN SIGNS ACCORD GIVING U.S. THE USE OF MILITARY BASES

Drops Neutrality in Ten-Year Defense Pact—Will Receive Arms and Economic Aid

FORCES TO BE MODERNIZED

West's Potential Strengthened, Washington Feels—Political Gains for Franco Seen

Text of the defense agreement is printed on Page 16.

By CAMILLE M. CHANFARRA
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26—Spain abandoned today her traditional policy of neutrality, which had kept her outside two world-wide conflicts in this century, by sign-

What Price New Pact?

Accord With Spain So Ambiguous Its Terms and Final Cost Are Uncertain

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The long delayed agreement with Spain granting the United States air and naval bases strengthens the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Mediterranean flank, but at a cost that is yet impossible to assess. The agreement has been reached at a time of apparent American retrenchment in foreign aid, over-against a continuing military spending, but also at a time when some of the past opposition of United States Allies to such an agreement has declined. The initial reaction from abroad to last week's signing of the base accord was philosophical rather than emotional; the pact had been accepted, at least on the surface, as a military necessity.

But what the ultimate reaction of Europe will be and just how much the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be strengthened will depend upon the agreement's detailed implementation.

The terms of the accord gave no real clue to its exact meaning, and the only thing that can be known for sure is that it has been few records among nations in history that have been couched in so many generalities and quietism with so many provisions, limitations and ambiguities. The commitments the United States has assumed in return for the right to use unspecified bases are nowhere clearly spelled out in the published documents, and the obligations of both countries in case of war were largely conditioned only in secret codicils. Thus, the base agreement commits the United States to certain practical military action unknown to the American people at an unestimated cost in men, military equipment and dollars without the ratification of the Spanish people.

U. S. Commitments Increased

This is, perhaps, the greatest disadvantage of the Spanish agreement and of some other recent military commitments and con-

ditions, and heavy bomber strips. And Spain, behind the rampart of the Pyrenees, provides a last line of defense if the rest of Western Europe should fall, and offers a springboard for American bases and air operations. Her bases are particularly important as an alternative to the great number of bases in Morocco, surrounded by political and social unrest, and the great supply and air installations in France, which might be threatened by Spanish Communists across the Rhine or by a change in present French policies perhaps induced by German armaments.

But the full military advantages of the accord will require considerably more than the initial economic and military aid of \$224,000,000 that has been promised to the Spanish Government. The Spanish Army of about twenty-five divisions (peasant strength, which probably could be more than doubled in war if equipment were available) needs virtually complete re-equipment, except for its tanks.

Spain's Planes Obsolete

The Air Force numbers a few hundred propeller-driven planes, all obsolete. The Navy has six cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, types and eight submarines, plus a miscellaneous collection of gunboats, minesweepers, etc., none of them modern and none of them fitted with the latest in radar, sonar, anti-sweeping gear or other essential equipment. If the entire military establishment is to be modernized, the cost will probably be far more than the \$141,000,000 now earmarked for the purpose.

The cost of the bases, four major airports and two naval facilities, is likely to total several hundred million dollars, if past experience with overseas bases is followed. And the obsolescent Spanish transportation system must be in part rehabilitated if the bases are to be supplied.

American dollar commitments to Spain are, therefore, certain to increase far beyond the initial figure, and ultimately to the tune of