Optimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matters
Resumen: In this paper, we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially beneficial but costly activities in order to convey information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary compensations in any one of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We find the subsidies that maximize social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal subsidies of changes in their determinants.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12369
Año: 2019
Publicado en: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 122 (2019), [24 pp.]
ISSN: 0347-0520

Factor impacto SCIMAGO:

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2016-75631-P
Tipo y forma: Article (PrePrint)
Área (Departamento): Área Fund. Análisis Económico (Dpto. Análisis Económico)
Exportado de SIDERAL (2019-09-09-15:08:27)

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 Notice créée le 2019-09-09, modifiée le 2019-09-09

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