The signalling role of over-education and qualifications mismatch
Resumen: Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.02.015
Año: 2019
Publicado en: JOURNAL OF POLICY MODELING 41, 1 (2019), 99-119
ISSN: 0161-8938

Factor impacto JCR: 1.486 (2019)
Categ. JCR: ECONOMICS rank: 177 / 371 = 0.477 (2019) - Q2 - T2
Factor impacto SCIMAGO: 0.979 - Economics and Econometrics (Q2)

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/S13
Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/UZ/UZ2015-SOC-01
Tipo y forma: Article (PostPrint)
Área (Departamento): Área Fund. Análisis Económico (Dpto. Análisis Económico)

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