000108536 001__ 108536 000108536 005__ 20230519145410.0 000108536 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.3390/e23080957 000108536 0248_ $$2sideral$$a125202 000108536 037__ $$aART-2021-125202 000108536 041__ $$aeng 000108536 100__ $$aGutiérrez, Oscar 000108536 245__ $$aAgency Contracts under Maximum-Entropy 000108536 260__ $$c2021 000108536 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000108536 5203_ $$aThis article proposes the application of the maximum-entropy principle (MEP) to agency contracting (where a principal hires an agent to make decisions on their behalf) in situations where the principal and agent only have partial knowledge on the probability distribution of the output conditioned on the agent’s actions. The paper characterizes the second-best agency contract from a maximum entropy distribution (MED) obtained from applying the MEP to the agency situation consistently with the information available. We show that, with the minimum shared information about the output distribution for the agency relationship to take place, the second-best compensation contract is (a monotone transformation of) an increasing affine function of output. With additional information on the output distribution, the second-best optimal contracts can be more complex. The second-best contracts obtained theoretically from the MEP cover many compensation schemes observed in real agency relationships. 000108536 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO-FEDER/ECO2017- 86305-C4-3-R 000108536 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ 000108536 590__ $$a2.738$$b2021 000108536 592__ $$a0.553$$b2021 000108536 594__ $$a4.4$$b2021 000108536 591__ $$aPHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY$$b42 / 86 = 0.488$$c2021$$dQ2$$eT2 000108536 593__ $$aElectrical and Electronic Engineering$$c2021$$dQ2 000108536 593__ $$aPhysics and Astronomy (miscellaneous)$$c2021$$dQ2 000108536 593__ $$aInformation Systems$$c2021$$dQ2 000108536 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 000108536 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-8405-1056$$aSalas-Fumás, Vicente$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000108536 7102_ $$14012$$2650$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Direcc.Organiza.Empresas$$cÁrea Organización de Empresas 000108536 773__ $$g23, 8 (2021), e957 [17 pp.]$$pEntropy$$tENTROPY$$x1099-4300 000108536 8564_ $$s1335569$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/108536/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada 000108536 8564_ $$s2685591$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/108536/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada 000108536 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:108536$$particulos$$pdriver 000108536 951__ $$a2023-05-18-13:54:36 000108536 980__ $$aARTICLE