000110782 001__ 110782
000110782 005__ 20230519145456.0
000110782 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1098/rstb.2020.0303
000110782 0248_ $$2sideral$$a126035
000110782 037__ $$aART-2021-126035
000110782 041__ $$aeng
000110782 100__ $$aGiardini, Francesca
000110782 245__ $$aGossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game
000110782 260__ $$c2021
000110782 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000110782 5203_ $$aWhen there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ''The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling''.
000110782 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN-FEDER/PGC2018-098186-B-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/FJCI-2016-28276$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/IJC-2019-040967-I
000110782 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
000110782 590__ $$a6.671$$b2021
000110782 592__ $$a2.151$$b2021
000110782 594__ $$a11.6$$b2021
000110782 591__ $$aBIOLOGY$$b14 / 94 = 0.149$$c2021$$dQ1$$eT1
000110782 593__ $$aBiochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology (miscellaneous)$$c2021$$dQ1
000110782 593__ $$aAgricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)$$c2021$$dQ1
000110782 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
000110782 700__ $$aVilone, Daniele
000110782 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-1874-2881$$aSanchez, Ángel
000110782 700__ $$aAntonioni, Alberto
000110782 773__ $$g376, 1838 (2021), 1-8$$pPhilos. trans. - R. Soc., Biol. sci.$$tPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences$$x0962-8436
000110782 8564_ $$s744667$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/110782/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada
000110782 8564_ $$s2711108$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/110782/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada
000110782 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:110782$$particulos$$pdriver
000110782 951__ $$a2023-05-18-14:51:08
000110782 980__ $$aARTICLE