000112439 001__ 112439 000112439 005__ 20240319081000.0 000112439 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.najef.2022.101689 000112439 0248_ $$2sideral$$a128287 000112439 037__ $$aART-2022-128287 000112439 041__ $$aeng 000112439 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-4767-913X$$aAlcalde, Nuria$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000112439 245__ $$aGovernment intervention in European mergers and acquisitions 000112439 260__ $$c2022 000112439 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000112439 5203_ $$aThe increasing globalization of economies has leveraged protectionist attitudes in different countries during the last decades. In the context of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), national governments have intervened to “protect” big domestic firms and their industries from foreign bidders. Despite the potential for severe implications of these actions on the internationalization of firms and development of markets, the research in this area is relatively scarce, and we still know very little about the real causes and consequences of government intervention. In this paper, we study government opposition to cross-border European M&A during the period 1997–2017, an era of important changes in Europe. Using an event study methodology, we examine abnormal returns for targets and their rivals in the time period prior to actual intervention to gauge if investors perceive intervened deals as harmful events for the industry, which could justify government intervention. We use a hand collected sample of 1,574 EU15 rival firms for 48 mergers, of which 18 experience government intervention. Entropy balanced regression models show that rivals of intervened targets earn significantly lower returns relative to rivals of non-intervened targets on deal announcement. Nevertheless, rivals’ abnormal returns are not negative, suggesting that intervened deals are not perceived ex ante as harmful for industry competitiveness. The results are more consistent with investors’ ability to identify likely blocked deals, which puts downward pressure on abnormal returns to both the target companies and their rivals. These findings indicate that government interventions against foreign bidders seem to have an economic cost in the sector that is anticipated by the investors. 000112439 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA-FEDER/S52-20R$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MECD/PRX17-00588$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2016-77843-P 000112439 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby-nc-nd$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ 000112439 590__ $$a3.6$$b2022 000112439 592__ $$a0.809$$b2022 000112439 591__ $$aECONOMICS$$b100 / 380 = 0.263$$c2022$$dQ2$$eT1 000112439 593__ $$aFinance$$c2022$$dQ2 000112439 591__ $$aBUSINESS, FINANCE$$b40 / 111 = 0.36$$c2022$$dQ2$$eT2 000112439 593__ $$aEconomics and Econometrics$$c2022$$dQ2 000112439 594__ $$a5.6$$b2022 000112439 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 000112439 700__ $$aPowell, Ronan 000112439 7102_ $$14012$$2650$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Direcc.Organiza.Empresas$$cÁrea Organización de Empresas 000112439 773__ $$g61 (2022), 101689 [18 pp.]$$pNORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE$$tNORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE$$x1062-9408 000112439 8564_ $$s392782$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/112439/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint 000112439 8564_ $$s2019645$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/112439/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint 000112439 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:112439$$particulos$$pdriver 000112439 951__ $$a2024-03-18-14:05:03 000112439 980__ $$aARTICLE