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<dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:invenio="http://invenio-software.org/elements/1.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:identifier>doi:10.1007/s11416-022-00444-z</dc:identifier><dc:language>eng</dc:language><dc:creator>Raimondo, M.</dc:creator><dc:creator>Bernardi, S.</dc:creator><dc:creator>Marrone, S.</dc:creator><dc:creator>Merseguer, J.</dc:creator><dc:title>An approach for the automatic verification of blockchain protocols: the Tweetchain case study</dc:title><dc:identifier>ART-2023-131433</dc:identifier><dc:description>This paper proposes a model-driven approach for the security modelling and analysis of blockchain based protocols. The modelling is built upon the definition of a UML profile, which is able to capture transaction-oriented information. The analysis is based on existing formal analysis tools. In particular, the paper considers the Tweetchain protocol, a recent proposal that leverages online social networks, i.e., Twitter, for extending blockchain to domains with small-value transactions, such as IoT. A specialized textual notation is added to the UML profile to capture features of this protocol. Furthermore, a model transformation is defined to generate a Tamarin model, from the UML models, via an intermediate well-known notation, i.e., the Alice &amp;Bob notation. Finally, Tamarin Prover is used to verify the model of the protocol against some security properties. This work extends a previous one, where the Tamarin formal models were generated by hand. A comparison on the analysis results, both under the functional and non-functional aspects, is reported here too.</dc:description><dc:date>2023</dc:date><dc:source>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/120921</dc:source><dc:doi>10.1007/s11416-022-00444-z</dc:doi><dc:identifier>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/120921</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>oai:zaguan.unizar.es:120921</dc:identifier><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/PID2020-113969RB-I00</dc:relation><dc:identifier.citation>Journal of computer virology and hacking techniques 19, 1 (2023), 17-32</dc:identifier.citation><dc:rights>by</dc:rights><dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/</dc:rights><dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights></dc:dc>

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