<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
<record>
  <controlfield tag="001">120921</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20240731103310.0</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">10.1007/s11416-022-00444-z</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="8" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="2">sideral</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">131433</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="037" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">ART-2023-131433</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">eng</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Raimondo, M.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">An approach for the automatic verification of blockchain protocols: the Tweetchain case study</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2023</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="506" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Access copy available to the general public</subfield>
    <subfield code="f">Unrestricted</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">This paper proposes a model-driven approach for the security modelling and analysis of blockchain based protocols. The modelling is built upon the definition of a UML profile, which is able to capture transaction-oriented information. The analysis is based on existing formal analysis tools. In particular, the paper considers the Tweetchain protocol, a recent proposal that leverages online social networks, i.e., Twitter, for extending blockchain to domains with small-value transactions, such as IoT. A specialized textual notation is added to the UML profile to capture features of this protocol. Furthermore, a model transformation is defined to generate a Tamarin model, from the UML models, via an intermediate well-known notation, i.e., the Alice &amp;Bob notation. Finally, Tamarin Prover is used to verify the model of the protocol against some security properties. This work extends a previous one, where the Tamarin formal models were generated by hand. A comparison on the analysis results, both under the functional and non-functional aspects, is reported here too.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="536" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="9">info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/PID2020-113969RB-I00</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="9">info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">by</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="592" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">0.443</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">2023</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="593" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Computer Science (miscellaneous)</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">2023</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">Q2</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="593" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Software</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">2023</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">Q3</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="593" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Hardware and Architecture</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">2023</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">Q3</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="593" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Computational Theory and Mathematics</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">2023</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">Q3</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="594" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">4.0</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">2023</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="4">
    <subfield code="a">info:eu-repo/semantics/article</subfield>
    <subfield code="v">info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Bernardi, S.</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
    <subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0002-2605-6243</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Marrone, S.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Merseguer, J.</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
    <subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0002-8917-6584</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="1">5007</subfield>
    <subfield code="2">570</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">Dpto. Informát.Ingenie.Sistms.</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">Área Lenguajes y Sistemas Inf.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="g">19, 1 (2023), 17-32</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">J. comput. virol. hacking tech.</subfield>
    <subfield code="t">Journal of computer virology and hacking techniques</subfield>
    <subfield code="x">2263-8733</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="s">1555018</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/120921/files/texto_completo.pdf</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">Versión publicada</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="s">2252130</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/120921/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon</subfield>
    <subfield code="x">icon</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">Versión publicada</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1="C" ind2="O">
    <subfield code="o">oai:zaguan.unizar.es:120921</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">articulos</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">driver</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">2024-07-31-09:39:16</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">ARTICLE</subfield>
  </datafield>
</record>
</collection>