000125358 001__ 125358 000125358 005__ 20241125101139.0 000125358 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.technovation.2023.102741 000125358 0248_ $$2sideral$$a133095 000125358 037__ $$aART-2023-133095 000125358 041__ $$aeng 000125358 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-7914-2623$$aSáenz-Royo, C.$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000125358 245__ $$aAuthoritarianism versus participation in innovation decisions 000125358 260__ $$c2023 000125358 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000125358 5203_ $$aWhy do innovation projects fail? The most common answers are (A) the implementation differs from what was planned; (B) despite positive expected payoffs, there is an ex-ante positive probability that payoff can be negative (risk). As a third option, we consider the fallibility of individuals who evaluate innovation projects using their limited information-processing capabilities (bounded rationality). Furthermore, we compare the overall organizational performance of two decision mechanisms. First, an informal Collective Decision as an unanimity participative mechanism to decide on technological innovation adoption and, second, a centralized Authority decision. Authority-based decision-making results in higher commission errors (acceptance of projects that an unbounded rational decision-maker would reject) and lower omission errors (rejection of projects that an unbounded rational decision-maker would accept) than Collective Decision. In a dynamic technological adoption process where a sequence of randomly generated innovation projects is evaluated using the two mechanisms, the simulations show that, in the short-term, omission errors dominate and Authority is preferred to Collective Decision; however, in the mid and long terms, commission errors dominate and Collective Decision is preferred to Authority, especially if Collective Decision does not incorporate social influence. With Collective Decision, the ratio of projects that fail is lower, more innovation projects are rejected, and fewer innovation projects are accepted, which can be interpreted as resistance to innovation. 000125358 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2021-122961NB-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/CREVALOR$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/E22-20R$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/PGC2018-096026-B-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2017-86305-C4-3-R 000125358 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ 000125358 590__ $$a11.1$$b2023 000125358 592__ $$a2.593$$b2023 000125358 591__ $$aENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL$$b3 / 69 = 0.043$$c2023$$dQ1$$eT1 000125358 593__ $$aManagement of Technology and Innovation$$c2023$$dQ1 000125358 591__ $$aMANAGEMENT$$b8 / 407 = 0.02$$c2023$$dQ1$$eT1 000125358 593__ $$aEngineering (miscellaneous)$$c2023$$dQ1 000125358 591__ $$aOPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE$$b2 / 106 = 0.019$$c2023$$dQ1$$eT1 000125358 594__ $$a15.1$$b2023 000125358 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 000125358 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-1184-5901$$aLozano-Rojo, Á.$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000125358 7102_ $$12006$$2440$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Matemáticas$$cÁrea Geometría y Topología 000125358 7102_ $$14012$$2650$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Direcc.Organiza.Empresas$$cÁrea Organización de Empresas 000125358 773__ $$g124 (2023), 102741 [16 pp.]$$pTechnovation$$tTECHNOVATION$$x0166-4972 000125358 8564_ $$s5373278$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/125358/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada 000125358 8564_ $$s2624958$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/125358/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada 000125358 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:125358$$particulos$$pdriver 000125358 951__ $$a2024-11-22-12:01:59 000125358 980__ $$aARTICLE