000126514 001__ 126514
000126514 005__ 20241125101134.0
000126514 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1108/BJM-09-2022-0354
000126514 0248_ $$2sideral$$a133923
000126514 037__ $$aART-2023-133923
000126514 041__ $$aeng
000126514 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-5068-8438$$aAcero, Isabel$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000126514 245__ $$aThe composition of the remuneration committee and the vertical pay gap: the role of proprietary directors in Spain
000126514 260__ $$c2023
000126514 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000126514 5203_ $$aPurpose
This study investigates whether the proportion of proprietary directors (blockholders or their representatives) on the board's remuneration committee influences vertical pay inequality in Spanish listed companies and whether this relationship can be conditioned by the concentration of ownership.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample contains information on the individual compensation of 1048 directors of 57 Spanish listed firms during the period 2013–2018 making up an unbalanced panel with 3565 observations. Panel data regressions are used to study how the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee influences the remuneration of directors, focusing not on their absolute remuneration levels, but rather on their relationship to the average remuneration of the organization's employees (as a measure of vertical pay inequality within the company). The authors also investigate whether this relationship is conditioned by firm ownership concentration.
Findings
The results indicate that the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee acts as a mechanism to reduce vertical pay inequality, even in the context of high ownership concentration.
Originality/value
Unlike the majority of previous research dedicated to the independence of the remuneration committee, this study focuses on the role played by proprietary directors. The results help elucidate the importance of proprietary directors to properly monitor and restrain directors' compensation in contexts of high ownership concentration.
000126514 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA-FEDER/S52-20R$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/PID2021-123154NB-I00
000126514 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby-nc$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/
000126514 590__ $$a2.4$$b2023
000126514 592__ $$a0.741$$b2023
000126514 591__ $$aMANAGEMENT$$b217 / 407 = 0.533$$c2023$$dQ3$$eT2
000126514 593__ $$aBusiness and International Management$$c2023$$dQ2
000126514 593__ $$aManagement of Technology and Innovation$$c2023$$dQ2
000126514 593__ $$aStrategy and Management$$c2023$$dQ2
000126514 593__ $$aOrganizational Behavior and Human Resource Management$$c2023$$dQ2
000126514 593__ $$aMarketing$$c2023$$dQ2
000126514 594__ $$a5.4$$b2023
000126514 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
000126514 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-4767-913X$$aAlcalde, Nuria$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000126514 7102_ $$14012$$2650$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Direcc.Organiza.Empresas$$cÁrea Organización de Empresas
000126514 773__ $$g18, 3 (2023), 386-401$$pBALTIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT$$tBaltic Journal of Management$$x1746-5265
000126514 8564_ $$s395376$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126514/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint
000126514 8564_ $$s1803788$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126514/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint
000126514 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:126514$$particulos$$pdriver
000126514 951__ $$a2024-11-22-12:00:17
000126514 980__ $$aARTICLE