000126839 001__ 126839
000126839 005__ 20241125101151.0
000126839 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1063/5.0147226
000126839 0248_ $$2sideral$$a133585
000126839 037__ $$aART-2023-133585
000126839 041__ $$aeng
000126839 100__ $$aLuo-Luo, Jiang
000126839 245__ $$aDeterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games
000126839 260__ $$c2023
000126839 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000126839 5203_ $$aCollective risk social dilemmas are at the heart of the most pressing global challenges we are facing today, including climate change mitigation and the overuse of natural resources. Previous research has framed this problem as a public goods game (PGG), where a dilemma arises between short-term interests and long-term sustainability. In the PGG, subjects are placed in groups and asked to choose between cooperation and defection, while keeping in mind their personal interests as well as the commons. Here, we explore how and to what extent the costly punishment of defectors is successful in enforcing cooperation by means of human experiments. We show that an apparent irrational underestimation of the risk of being punished plays an important role, and that for sufficiently high punishment fines, this vanishes and the threat of deterrence suffices to preserve the commons. Interestingly, however, we find that high fines not only avert freeriders, but they also demotivate some of the most generous altruists. As a consequence, the tragedy of the commons is predominantly averted due to cooperators that contribute only their “fair share” to the common pool. We also find that larger groups require larger fines for the deterrence of punishment to have the desired prosocial effect.
000126839 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aAll rights reserved$$uhttp://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/
000126839 590__ $$a2.7$$b2023
000126839 592__ $$a0.778$$b2023
000126839 591__ $$aPHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL$$b5 / 60 = 0.083$$c2023$$dQ1$$eT1
000126839 593__ $$aPhysics and Astronomy (miscellaneous)$$c2023$$dQ1
000126839 591__ $$aMATHEMATICS, APPLIED$$b25 / 332 = 0.075$$c2023$$dQ1$$eT1
000126839 593__ $$aMathematical Physics$$c2023$$dQ2
000126839 593__ $$aStatistical and Nonlinear Physics$$c2023$$dQ2
000126839 593__ $$aApplied Mathematics$$c2023$$dQ2
000126839 593__ $$aMedicine (miscellaneous)$$c2023$$dQ2
000126839 594__ $$a5.2$$b2023
000126839 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
000126839 700__ $$aZhi, Chen
000126839 700__ $$aMatjaž, Perc
000126839 700__ $$aZhen, Wang
000126839 700__ $$aKurths, Jürgen
000126839 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-0895-1893$$aMoreno, Yamir$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000126839 7102_ $$12004$$2405$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Física Teórica$$cÁrea Física Teórica
000126839 773__ $$g33, 4 (2023), 043127 [8 pp.]$$pChaos$$tCHAOS$$x1054-1500
000126839 8564_ $$s659743$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126839/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint
000126839 8564_ $$s2484714$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126839/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint
000126839 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:126839$$particulos$$pdriver
000126839 951__ $$a2024-11-22-12:07:00
000126839 980__ $$aARTICLE