126839 20241125101151.0 doi 10.1063/5.0147226 sideral 133585 ART-2023-133585 eng Luo-Luo, Jiang Deterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games 2023 Access copy available to the general public Unrestricted Collective risk social dilemmas are at the heart of the most pressing global challenges we are facing today, including climate change mitigation and the overuse of natural resources. Previous research has framed this problem as a public goods game (PGG), where a dilemma arises between short-term interests and long-term sustainability. In the PGG, subjects are placed in groups and asked to choose between cooperation and defection, while keeping in mind their personal interests as well as the commons. Here, we explore how and to what extent the costly punishment of defectors is successful in enforcing cooperation by means of human experiments. We show that an apparent irrational underestimation of the risk of being punished plays an important role, and that for sufficiently high punishment fines, this vanishes and the threat of deterrence suffices to preserve the commons. Interestingly, however, we find that high fines not only avert freeriders, but they also demotivate some of the most generous altruists. As a consequence, the tragedy of the commons is predominantly averted due to cooperators that contribute only their “fair share” to the common pool. We also find that larger groups require larger fines for the deterrence of punishment to have the desired prosocial effect. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess All rights reserved http://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/ 2.7 2023 PHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL 5 / 60 = 0.083 2023 Q1 T1 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED 25 / 332 = 0.075 2023 Q1 T1 0.778 2023 Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous) 2023 Q1 Mathematical Physics 2023 Q2 Statistical and Nonlinear Physics 2023 Q2 Applied Mathematics 2023 Q2 Medicine (miscellaneous) 2023 Q2 5.2 2023 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Zhi, Chen Matjaž, Perc Zhen, Wang Kurths, Jürgen Moreno, Yamir Universidad de Zaragoza (orcid)0000-0002-0895-1893 2004 405 Universidad de Zaragoza Dpto. Física Teórica Área Física Teórica 33, 4 (2023), 043127 [8 pp.] Chaos CHAOS 1054-1500 659743 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126839/files/texto_completo.pdf Postprint 2484714 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/126839/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon icon Postprint oai:zaguan.unizar.es:126839 articulos driver 2024-11-22-12:07:00 ARTICLE