

Riding Routes and Itinerant Borders: Autonomy of Migration and Border Externalization

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Abstract: Despite technological upgrading of borders at the edges of Europe, “Fortress Europe” continues to fail as an effective means of controlling irregular migration. As a consequence, European states are restructuring their border regimes by externalizing migration management to non-EU countries beyond the border and creating new programs and policies to do so. *Autonomy of Migration* (AoM) offers a distinct way for thinking about border control mechanisms and goals of managing mobility. AoM does not read this offshoring of borders through the lens of centralized and coordinated state powers, but develops an *autonomous gaze* that supplements these institutional readings of apparatuses of capture with a view that takes as its starting point the ways in which border architectures, institutions, and policies interact with and react to the turbulence of migrant mobilities. By engaging current EU externalization policies, this paper illustrates the shifting relationship between border control and mobility.

Resumen: A pesar de las actualizaciones tecnológicas recientes de la frontera en el perímetro de la Unión Europea, la llamada “Europa Fortaleza”, tanto como metáfora como realidad, continua sin poder controlar la migración irregular. En respuesta, los estados miembros de la Unión están reestructurando sus sistemas fronterizos externalizando la gestión migratoria a países no miembros de la UE, delegando funciones de control migratorio a países fuera de la frontera europea. El enfoque de la *Autonomía de la Migración* (AoM) ofrece un análisis poco común para pensar los mecanismos de control fronterizo y sus objetivos de gestionar la movilidad humana. AoM no interpreta dicho desplazamiento de fronteras únicamente desde la óptica del poder estatal centralizado. AoM ofrece una *mirada autónoma* de la movilidad, complementando esas lecturas institucionales que enfatizan los aparatos de captura. Así, AoM enfatiza la turbulencia de las migraciones como parte constituyente, y no solo receptiva, de las arquitecturas, instituciones y políticas fronterizas. Este artículo sobre la externalización de las políticas fronterizas de la Unión Europea ilustra la relación productiva entre control migratorio fronterizo y movilidad migratoria.

Keywords: autonomy, migration, externalization, borders, EU, North Africa

Palabras claves: autonomía, migración, externalización, fronteras, UE, Africa del Norte

1 We need immediately to abandon the maps that merely reproduce the flat world of
2 Ptolemy, where you drop off the edge of the universe. We need new sea charts. (Yann
3 Moulrier-Boutang 2011:3)
4

5 Introduction

6 Since the early 2000s, European Union border management practices have been and
7 continue to be fundamentally restructured as a result of the expansion of migration
8 flows into member states, particularly as wall jumps in Ceuta and Melilla increased
9 and boat interceptions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean became commonplace. In
10 this paper we chart this transformation of border management practices through the
11 development of one particularly important new initiative that is reworking the spatial
12 imaginaries of the border—*border externalization*—and one equally innovative analyti-
13 cal shift in conceptualizing the relationship between border management and migrant
14 lives—*autonomy of migration*. Border externalization refers to a fundamental change in
15 the scales and operations of border institutions, shifting bordering practices from what
16 Raeymaekers (2014:168) has recently referred to as the “stable ground of national
17 checkpoints and territorial lines on maps to make them part of a more fluid landscape
18 built on overlapping, and often contradictory, histories of mobility and exchange” (see
19 also Anderson 2000; Casas et al. 2013; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002; Walters 2002). ^{Q2}
20 Autonomy of migration refers to a rapidly developing series of ideas that reflect a kind
21 of Copernican turn in migration studies in which the focus has shifted from the appa-
22 ratuses of control to the multiple and diverse ways in which migration responds to,
23 operates independently from, and in turn shapes those apparatuses and their corre-
24 sponding institutions and practices. We interrogate border externalization through
25 emerging autonomist theories of migration to show how current migration streams
26 are driving border management practices to become much more flexible, to extend
27 them across a wider geographical area, and to engage with the complex relational
28 spaces of migrant mobilities. This spatialization of such notions of multiplicities, sur-
29 plus, and excess aims to clarify some key dimensions of migration practices “on the
30 ground” by paying attention to migrant itineraries, spaces, and tactics *en route*.
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32 Building on this spatial approach towards European migration policies in the
33 Mediterranean region, we focus on the ways in which emerging border externaliza-
34 tion practices and institutions are changing the structures and practices of adminis-
35 tration, territoriality, and corresponding claims on sovereignty. We show how
36 migrant tactics constitute ongoing forms of deterritorialization that necessitate
37 new forms of state action and expanded border management regimes. We read
38 these emerging European border management institutions and bordering practices
39 in terms of new geopolitical forms of management that Raeymaekers (2014:169)
40 has described as the “topological dimension of the border as a constantly imman-
41 ent force ... against state-centric vision[s]”.
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43 Autonomy of Migration

44 In his extensive writings on mobility, Yann Moulrier-Boutang argued for a reversal of
45 the dominant logics that address migration through the lenses of state capture and
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1 institutional coherence (see especially Moulier-Boutang 1998). In his view, migra-
2 tion had for too long been attributed too one-sidedly to economic logics of labour
3 market demand and treated as a matter of administrative regulation. In framing
4 what he referred to as the concept of *Autonomy of Migration* (AoM) he highlighted
5 the primacy of mobility in the history of capitalist development, drawing on an
6 unorthodox Marxist reading of slave struggles as one of the main motors for the
7 arrival of free waged labour. In this genealogy of mobility as well as in previous
8 engagements with the racial politics of labour (Moulier-Boutang 1992) and the
9 management of irregular migration (Moulier-Boutang and Garson 1984), Moulier-
10 Boutang reversed the traditional relationship between state administration and mo-
11 bility, pointing to the ways in which experts and agencies dealing with migration
12 had often failed to acknowledge the force and effects of migrant flows.¹

13 More recently, a growing number of scholars and migrant movement activists
14 based in different parts of the world have coalesced around this notion of AoM,
15 reinvigorating scholarly and public debates about migration (De Genova et al.
16 2015). AoM argues that migration policy and research that privileges the analysis
17 of migrants primarily as jobseekers and refugees fails to adequately represent the
18 *subjective* diversity of migrant mobilities, the dynamic power of migrants them-
19 selves, and the analytical value of taking mobility seriously as a starting point for
20 understanding border policies. For Bojadžijev and Karakayali (2010), the contours
21 of this

22 new regime of emerging migration politics ... [traces] the crossing of borders, the tra-
23 versing of territories, the enmeshing of cultures, the unsettling of institutions (first
24 among them nation-states, but also citizenship), the connecting of languages, and the
25 flight from exploitation and oppression ... [We are] interested, in other words, in investi-
26 gating what migration teaches us about the conditions of contemporary forms of social-
27 ity, and that which goes beyond them.

28 Developed further through a series of antiracist activist efforts based in Germany
29 in the late 1990s and 2000s, and led mainly by second-generation migrants' mobi-
30 lizations, the "methodology" or perspective of AoM was deployed to challenge re-
31 ceived interpretations of migration and advance a reading that focused on the
32 analysis of diverse processes of subjectification and the development of interven-
33 tions to support their multiplication. Here the diversity of migrant practices and be-
34 haviours became sites of political mobilization and organization. Also called *Kanak-*
35 *Operaismo*, this tradition brought migration to the forefront of political analysis and
36 action. *Kanak*, referring to inhabitants of the former German New Guinea colony, is
37 a racist slur used mainly against guest-workers that came to Germany between
38 1950 and 1970. *Operaismo* refers to *workerism*, a movement and approach devel-
39 oped in the early 1960s in Italy focused on the ways in which working class actions
40 instigated transformation in which capitalist restructuring was understood as reac-
41 tive to worker struggles. Linking these two concepts allowed *Kanak-Operaismo*
42 activists (and later others) to focus on the actions of migrants, not as subjects of
43 pure agency or as liberal individuals with or without rights, but as complexes of
44 practices that always exceed the ability of migration policies and state authorities
45 to fix and control them. Instead, these policies and authorities were seen as
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1 responding to, and sometimes overwhelmed by the surplus and excess of migrant
 2 lives. Particularly through the *Kanak Attak* collective, a new vision around migration
 3 infused many of the political struggles around mobility and precarity in Central and
 4 Southern Europe (Heidenreich and Vukadinovic 2008; Kanak Attak 2004). The result Q3
 5 was a series of theoretically grounded activist efforts, drawing inspiration from
 6 debates around Operaismo, Autonomia, Post/De-Colonial and Queer Studies,
 7 including groups such as the *No One Is Illegal* campaign, *No Border Camps*,
 8 *Anti-Deportation Class*, the *Frassanito Network*, *MigMap*, *EuroMayDay*, *KritNet* and
 9 *Ferrocarril Clandestino*.

10 Drawing on and extending the Copernican turn in Italian workerism and post-
 11 workerism (the reversal of the capital–labour duality) to focus on the ways in which
 12 capital responds to the social dynamics and demands of workers, AoM seeks to re-
 13 interpret the effects of seeing regular, irregular, transit and other forms of migration
 14 as constitutive factors of border policies, architectures, and practices. In so doing
 15 AoM has opened *operaismo* to encounters with the black radical tradition, postcolo-
 16 nial thought, feminist criticism, and anticolonial and antiracist politics (Mezzadra
 17 and Neilson 2013b:333). The result has been a variety of engagements with some
 18 version of AoM (Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; De Genova 2009; Georgi and
 19 Schatral 2012; Hess 2010; Mezzadra 2004; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013a, 2013b; Q4
 20 Mitropoulos, 2007; Nyers 2003; Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Squire 2011). Q5

21 Two books in particular, *Escape Routes* (Papadopoulos et al., 2008) and *Border as*
 22 *Method* (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013a) respond further to the challenge posed by
 23 AoM to go beyond migration itself as an object of study. *Escape Routes* focuses on
 24 flight and mobility as productive forces, “taking us beyond current predicaments
 25 of resistance” by pointing out how *mobility* is at the core of both resistance practices
 26 and power configurations (Papadopoulos et al., 2008:82, 203; see also the review
 27 symposium published by *Rethinking Marxism* 2012) where this concept of resistance
 28 is elaborated. Shukaitis (2012:425), in particular, points out how, by expanding the Q6
 29 notion of refusal, *Escape Routes* developed the concept of “imperceptible politics”
 30 separate from the logic of rights and representation, “reworking the central auton-
 31 omist idea that resistance is the prior and determining dynamic”. Here resistance is
 32 not particular to the realm of waged labour, but permeates all forms of sociality.
 33 This reading of AoM challenges the idea that control and resistance are two differ-
 34 ent moments. Instead, their interaction creates a surplus and excess not reducible
 35 to what existed before, producing what the authors refer to as “new ecologies of
 36 existence” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). *Border as Method* builds on AoM Q7
 37 ideas to frame the border epistemologically and methodologically in order to de-
 38 velop a conjunctural analysis of current capitalist configurations (Mezzadra and
 39 Neilson, 2013a, 2013b:18). In so doing it provides a method for reading the con-
 40 cept of border in terms of “multi-scalar processes of political geography” (Clough
 41 2013:327).

42 While the policies and institutions of border and migration management often
 43 violently disrupt migrant lives and livelihoods, their efforts to manage flows ulti-
 44 mately fall short because of the disjunctures between management practices and
 45 the diversity of migrants and migration streams they seek to regulate (De Genova
 46 et al. 2015). In this way, AoM approaches—and our approach in this paper—seek
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1 to de-centre the logics of command and control that lead to overly mechanistic
2 accounts of EU policies. Instead we focus on the constituent power of migrant
3 journeys, what, paraphrasing Tsianos and Papadopulus, we call the *ecologies of*
4 *mobile existence* along multiple itineraries.² By foregrounding this complex series
5 of migrant movements and actions as generative forces with which institutions
6 interact, we invert theoretically and strategically the more traditional tropes of
7 border management as a control apparatus that frames, contains, and controls
8 migrant movements. By so foregrounding the dynamism and diversity of migrant
9 mobilities, our goal is to write a different account of border externalization policies.
10 Instead of reading the border as a limit of migrant capacities, we seek instead to read
11 the border as a contested space in which the state struggles (and often fails) to main-
12 tain its fictitious commitments to territorial sovereignty, its “rights” over popula-
13 tions, and its monopoly over legitimate movement (Torpey 2000).

14 We ask, what added insight into border externalization can be gained if we re-
15 frame migration away from a focus on structural causes (such as push-pull factors
16 driven by labour market concerns) or victimization approaches that see migrants
17 as objects of a nearly all powerful sovereign, and instead reinterpret these policies
18 of border externalization through an analysis that sees migration as a set of mobile
19 and creative forces that constantly push institutional arrangements to shift their
20 strategies and build new architectures (see also Garelli et al. 2013)? That is, we fo-
21 cus on the relationality among processes of mobility and processes of control in this
22 emerging external bordering regime. The next section engages with two of the
23 main contributions of AoM that are particularly important for understanding the ex-
24 ternal dimension of the border regime: (1) migration movements as turbulent
25 forces; and (2) the border regime as a bio-political ordering of populations based
26 on the need to manage both the demands of economic integration and a racialized
27 politics of labour controls. We then bring this “gaze of autonomy” (Mezzadra
28 2011) to the specific policy framework of the *Global Approach to Migration* (GAM).
29 The insights gained from this autonomous gaze raise provocative questions about
30 the changing roles and spaces of borders, transformations in the state/territory
31 nexus, and the re-articulations of current international divisions of labour in light
32 of mobility’s turbulence.

33 **Autonomy of Migration: Excess, Turbulence, and** 34 **Irreducibility**

35 We are here because we destroy your borders! (Banner at the anti-G8 summit,
36 Heiligendamm 2007)³

37
38 Discussions over “Autonomy of Migration” in Europe coalesced as a critique of
39 the metaphor of “Fortress Europe” by a series of antiracist activist efforts in
40 Germany around 2000. These struggles were inserted into broader European net-
41 works linking issues of migration and precarity, pointing out how the term *Fortress*
42 suggests a misleading image of infallibility for the transnational and coordinated
43 surveillance of the European borders. Here “the appellation Fortress Europe, due
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to its more or less totalitarian conceptualization, necessarily essentializes the power of the border regimes” (Heidenreich and Vukadinovic 2008:140). In the words of two members of *Kanak Attak* (Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010:1): Q8

An important aspect of this critique was its questioning of the presumption that migration policies were exclusively determined by states and the institutions of border control ... The border regime does not transform of its own accord, but rather obtains its dynamic from the forms of migration movements.

Mezzadra (2011) refers to this as the “gaze of autonomy”; a relational understanding of power formations, acknowledging the active and precursory role of migration movements in the development and the transformation of border regimes. Two primary elements define this focus on autonomy: (1) migration is seen as a productive collective force; and (2) the border regime is understood as a biopolitical matrix geared to ordering populations and differentiating mobilities based on a complex and shifting hierarchy of legal status.

Migration as a Productive Collective Force

An autonomous reading of migration goes beyond the victimization and objectification of migration, questioning classical functionalist analyses that attempt to explain migration as either the product of cost–benefit calculations in the framework of push and pull factors or as a mere supplier of labour market worker shortages (Hess 2008:3). Instead, transnational mobility is conceived as an “irreducible force” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008) beyond—although by no means inattentive to—the objective causes that lead migrants to migrate or flee from the rigidities of migration controls (Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010). This quality of “excess” led to an approach that thinks of migration as a unique kind of collective action that challenges institutional power to reshape the border regime (Mezzadra 2011:129). For Mitropoulos (2010), “[t]he concept of autonomy was a way of thinking of the act of migration itself as a political act”.

This re-signification of migration as a “creative force” avoids a free will- or liberal-based notion of political agency, embracing the unpredictable and ambivalent character of migration understood as “turbulence” (Papastergiadis 2000). Q9 But this is not a straightforward assertion of migrant agency. Aware of the risk of over-romanticizing migrant movements, Mezzadra (in Casas et al. 2011a:588) argues that:

The autonomy of migration approach, in this regard ... does not lead to downplaying the role of power relationships within this field; rather, it is intended to open up a new angle on these very relationships, emphasizing resistance and struggle as their constitutive elements. We are not far from Foucault’s theory of power, in this general sense.

In Europe, this approach led *Kanak Operaism* to articulate a research and political agenda sensitive to histories of migration struggles usually ignored in more official or traditional analyses, visualizing the role of realities and itineraries of

1 mobility in making and re-making border spaces (Heidenreich and Vukadinovc
2 2008:139).

3 4 5 **Mobility as a Re-making of Space**

6 In his report on a specific campaign by undocumented migrants touring the US in a
7 political caravan, De Genova (2009:450) pointed out how the act of moving as un-
8 documented migrants—even within the limits of a state—represents an act of collec-
9 tive re-making of space that in turn leads to transformations in state management
10 strategies:

11 In this sense, the most profound and enduring radicality of the Immigrant Workers
12 Freedom Ride of 2003 derived not from any explicit program of political demands. In
13 Lefebvre's terms, this movement effectively made "the reappropriation of the body,
14 in association with the reappropriation of space, in to a non-negotiable part of its
15 agenda" ... Re-inscribing the space of the US nation-state, they truly produced a "differ-
16 ential space", where the predicates of the political were significantly reformulated on
17 their own terms.

18
19 The re-making of territories is thus at the heart of understanding both the politics
20 of migration and the politics of control. Elsewhere we have mapped out elements of
21 these emerging spaces, institutional structures of externalized migration manage-
22 ment, and new architectures of border surveillance and control beyond EU borders
23 (Casas et al. 2011b, 2013, 2014). Here we seek to build on these readings of border
24 externalization to analyze trans-Saharan migrant itineraries as seizing the ability to
25 move across borders and indirectly placing new demands on how the EU, its mem-
26 ber states, neighbouring states and neighbours of neighbours understand and
27 manage citizenship. From our perspective, we ask how these turbulent migrant itin-
28 eraries are re-drawing the cognitive and literal maps of territoriality, border, belong-
29 ing, sovereignty and experience.

30 A simple chart of one migrant's efforts to initially reach Spain illustrates the
31 complexity of movement involved as well as the opportunities for abuse, obsta-
32 cles encountered, and the tenacity and innovation demonstrated in the migration
33 story (see Figure 1). The map traces the itinerary(ies) of one migrant from Guinea-F1
34 Conakry. The stops *en route* are numbered, with lines and nodes indicating differ-
35 ent modes of transport, the amount of time in each stop (whether for days,
36 weeks, or years), and legal status in each place. This zigzag is not to be read ex-
37 clusively as a "cat-and-mouse" game with the resulting victim and/or hero of such
38 an enterprise. The indeterminacy of itineraries may sometimes be due to the im-
39 possibility of passing border controls or the direct (and frequent) exercise of force
40 against illegalized migrants, but may also be due to new opportunities, desires or
41 social networks in particular places and "stops" (permanent or temporary) along
42 the way.

43 The concept of routes and itineraries points to an important conceptual issue in
44 the spatial production of migration. Routes refer to the ways in which migration
45 management seeks to channel movements into migration routes (eg Schengen visa
46 requirements for migrants coming from North African countries), whereas
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


Figure 1: From Conakry to Dakar: an example of the route of a migrant in Africa/De Conakry à Dakar: Un exemple de parcours de migrant en Afrique (source: Migreurop 2011:20; reproduced here with permission from the cartographer, Nicolas Pernet, La Cimade)

itineraries refers to the migrants' paths and passages whose spatial configurations always exceed the ability of formal routes management to synthesize and regulate them. Indeed, migrant itineraries force migration management authorities to be attentive to the need to adjust and re-route these spatial canalizations, even as individual migrants may be channelled into or captured by them. This indeterminacy among the words "routes", "movements", and "itineraries" is important precisely in order to differentiate the spatial processes to which they refer, and to show how each designates different spatial processes, with "routes" being used primarily to indicate migration control while "itinerary" and "movements" are used to refer to migrant practices.

One outcome of such turbulent yet complexly socialized flows is a constant reworking of notions of destination. While Europe is the putative goal of many such migrants, and it is certainly scripted as the goal by many EU and member state policy actors, the actual itineraries and networks migrants follow depend on detailed knowledge about differential opportunities, supportive or threatening locales and routes, and complex systems of credit, sharing, and social obligation among migrants themselves, their hosts, and helpers along the way (Alioua 2007, 2013; Collyer 2007; de Haas 2007). Some itineraries are oriented toward other destinations (such as the Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea); others are directed toward parts of North Africa, especially Libya up until the early 2000s (see de Haas 2007). Along different parts of the migrant's journey, regular legal migration mixes with "irregular" migration, and in some cases the same person on the same "route" changes 'status' as he or she moves from place to place. Thus, instead of understanding power as totalizing or repressive, this concept of autonomy foregrounds the complex distributions of power in circuits of migration: "it focuses on the migrants' struggles, their ability to move, their desire to go beyond spaces, tribes,

and territories” (Heidenreich and Vukadinovc 2008:141) with the diverse and complex institutional border regimes they must navigate.

No Capitalism without the Control of Mobility: On the Biopolitical Matrix of the Border

In “*AoM, 10 Theses for a Method*” Bojadzijeve and Karakayali (in Heidenreich and Vukadinovc 2008:141) pointed out that “the borders are not simply closed, Europe is not sealing itself off, rather a complex system is emerging, one of limitation, differentiation, hierarchialization and partial inclusion of migrants groups”. In this way, the autonomy of migration recognizes the ways in which current border policies respond to these “excesses” of mobility, and the many ways in which people cross borders, build networks, and develop practices of citizenship regardless of their juridical status (Nyers 2003; Rigo 2011).

While closing borders and criminalizing undocumented migrants have emerged as central tropes of border management, border authorities themselves increasingly recognize the need to move beyond strictly “stopping movement”; that “the previous migration policy mainly focusing on control and security issues failed” (Hess 2008:3). As a consequence, the practices of border and migration management have become increasingly attentive to the tactics developed by migrants in order to frame new biopolitical strategies and instruments for managing the border.

Here, border policy deals strategically with the collective agency of migrants, understood as a “creative force”, categorizing types of mobile bodies and regulating diverse forms of mobility.⁴ This is a shifting body politic that creates highly differentiated legal frameworks of rights and types of migrants (eg a skilled migrant labour agreement with country “X”, an agricultural guest worker agreement with country “Y”, and a visa waiver with country “Z”). It is a system of registration and regulation that literally produces the specific migrant, a process that gives rise to and institutionalizes the undocumented, irregular, and transit migrant. Thus for Bojadzijeve and Karakayali (2010: thesis no. 8) the terms “mobility” and “mob” share a revealing common etymology, both deriving from the Latin word for movement, where the mobile mob is historically rendered as “outside” the state:

Structurally, this was stabilized through the wage-form and the commodity-form of labour-power, which transformed the labour market into a terrain of struggle: the “dirty competition” of women and children was driven out of the labour market. “Foreigners” also belonged to this category of dirty competition—which is why it is no coincidence that trade unions have historically taken a position against migration.

These *irregulars*—what Guy Standing (2011) has called the precarious and dangerous class—are most clearly typologized as the “illegal migrant” (Belguendouz 2009; De Genova 2002). For De Genova and Peutz (2010:91) this led to the use of deportation as a form of labour subordination in which “the securitisation of migration, ‘irregularization’, and deportability” operate through “their affinities with a wider (global) politics of labour subordination”. In this way, labour mobility is regulated through dual processes of containment and valorization, as part of a broader political economy that objectifies and forms labour in this specific and often

1 exploited relation to capital (Mezzadra 2011:124). For De Genova (2009:455), “[i]f
2 the state and capital work assiduously to render migrant labour a tractable object ...
3 the robust defiance of migrant workers (both the undocumented and guest
4 workers) audaciously reaffirms the primacy of labour as subject”.

5 Here the border regime comprises migrants’ movements that negotiate space
6 and the institutions of policing, interdiction, and returns in ways that both reinforce
7 existing distributions of control and simultaneously create new webs and relations
8 of power. In the following section we show how current practices of border external-
9 ization by the EU and its member states are responding to these dynamics as
10 they attempt to regulate the diversity of migrant demands and movements.

11 **The Gaze of Autonomy and Border Externalization**

12 Europe is closing our borders. (*Le Soleil* [Senegalese newspaper] 2006)

13 One of the leading EU policy frameworks of border externalization is GAM. This
14 policy framework exemplifies two shifts in border management. First, there is a spa-
15 tial shift in operationalizing a notion of the border that is adapted to mobile itiner-
16 aries. Second, there is a redefinition of migration management that looks beyond
17 the territorial borders of destination states. This redefinition of migration policy
18 seeks to manage mobility by acting transnationally and channeling migrants differ-
19 entially according to their status (including but not limited to circular migration
20 programs to the illegal migration industry and development projects abroad). In
21 this sense the GAM framework is a “productive” response to the “excess and turbu-
22 lence” of migration movements.

23 The goal of developing such an external dimension of border policy for the EU as a
24 whole was made explicit during the European Council Summit of Tampere in 1999.
25 Since then, collaboration with non-EU countries in the control and management of mi-
26 gration flows has become a central imperative of EU border policy. One such key policy
27 framework is the GAM and its strategies like Migratory Routes Management (MRM).⁵
28 GAM was initiated by the EU in 2005 and aimed at creating a series of bilateral and
29 multilateral migration policy plans and joint police operations in the neighbouring
30 as well as non-neighbouring countries of the EU. Spain’s role in Morocco and other
31 north and west African countries is a test case for border externalization and the routes
32 strategy (see Casas et al. 2011b, 2014). After upgrading the technologies of its own
33 borders, Spain shifted its attention from the borderline to tracing the origin of mi-
34 grant, their itineraries and efforts at interdiction in the shifting places of transit.

35 The *modus operandi* of these border externalization policies has recently been ad-
36 dressed by others (Aubarell et al. 2009; Belguendouz 2009; Zapata Barrero 2010). Q11
37 Some have pointed to the possible legal challenges and failures (Nicholson 2011;
38 Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010), criticized the consequences of route management
39 (Kleist 2011) or reflected on the geographic considerations of such “spatial
40 stretching” of the border (Casas et al. 2011b, 2013,). But, to date one of the main
41 components of this border policy transformation has not been addressed: the trans-
42 formative effects in shaping these institutional responses and border management
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1 practices by migration movements themselves. Our reading points to the roles
2 played by actual migrant itineraries as “acts of citizenship” (Nyers 2003) regardless
3 of their actual administrative status or location.⁶

4 GAM is a comprehensive framework approved by the Council of the EU in
5 December 2005 (Council of the European Union 2005).⁷ It initially focused on Q12
6 the southern Mediterranean and Africa as a reaction to perceptions of a crisis situa-
7 tion with regards to irregular migration from those regions (Council of the
8 European Union 2005). The fence jumps at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
9 Melilla in northern Africa in the Fall of 2005 were crucial events that highlighted for
10 the EU and member states the need for a new political relationship that would allow
11 them to collaborate with non-EU states to deal with migration “up-stream” (Com-
12 mission of the European Communities 2005:3; see also Council of the European
13 Union 2002:11). In the Commission of the European Communities’s own words:

14 [t]he Global Approach to Migration (GAM) brings together migration, external relations,
15 and development policy to address migration in an integrated, comprehensive and bal-
16 anced way *in partnership with third countries*. It comprises the whole migration agenda ...
17 and uses the concept of “migratory routes” to develop and implement policy
18 (2007a:18).

19
20 GAM seeks to create a comprehensive framework that:

21 ... can be defined as the external dimension of the European Union’s migration policy ...
22 The approach therefore addresses three equally important thematic dimensions: the
23 management of legal migration, the prevention and reduction of illegal migration,
24 and the relation between migration and development (Commission of the European
25 Communities 2008:1).

26
27 In order to develop and implement this overarching policy and materialize its in-
28 ternational scope, the EU Commission proposed the Migration Routes Initiative.
29 This initiative focuses attention on the main migratory itineraries passing through
30 several regions *en route* to the EU (or where migratory flows are assumed to be
31 EU bound), “taking into account the need to work in close collaboration with the
32 third countries along these routes” (Commission of the European Communities
33 2007b:19).⁸

34 GAM is a unique framework in at least three ways. First, it does not have a specific
35 organizational locus, but functions as a strategic policy commitment on the part of
36 the EU and member state institutions. Second, it has a specific spatial strategy fo-
37 cused on migratory routes. This implies a reorientation of border management
38 from a “front-line” to a series of points and surveillance nodes along changing itin-
39 eraries. This “routes” approach requires cooperation among several countries,
40 termed in EU official language as “origin, transit, and destination countries”. Third,
41 GAM breaks down this new approach toward migrations and borders into three ac-
42 tion areas: Pillar #1 deals with legal labour migration; Pillar #2 deals with combat-
43 ing illegal migration; and Pillar #3 deals with migration and development. This
44 three-pronged approach is a new element of EU migration policy thinking which
45 until recently had taken illegal migration and readmission as the primary focus of
46 migration management (Council of the EU, interview, February 2011).

1 The strategy requires a new spatial imaginary and a new way of thinking about
2 the border as well as novel institutions and forms of institutional cooperation that
3 can implement this new geography and the various policy realms it requires in
4 the face of the diversity of migration movements and actors to which it responds.
5 Specifically it involves a *spatial* and *institutional stretching* of border policy. Here,
6 border controls move beyond the territorial limits of the state; for example, from
7 the fences of Ceuta/Melilla into Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania, tracing out the
8 complex routes and nodes along which migrants move. In the process, new forms
9 of integration and cooperation among institutions and policy actors (from police
10 and justice, to employment, to socio-economic development) create architectures
11 for the implementation and coordination of the three action pillars of border polic-
12 ing, labour recruitment, and development in origin countries.

13 While the language of GAM—of routes, pillars, and holistic approaches—has
14 spread well beyond the EU Commission, it still represents a policy framework,
15 and an idealized abstract *prototype* rather than a functioning machine of EU mem-
16 ber state power. GAM is a multi-country, multi-regional, state and non-state plane
17 of migratory policy that has become a site of important debates, tensions, struggles
18 and slippages.

21 **Migration Routes Management: Managing Turbulent** 22 **Movements?**

23 *Acknowledging the Power of Migrants' Itineraries*

24 The Routes Management approach developed under GAM emerged in response to
25 a series of shifts in irregular migration in North Africa. Even cooperation in border
26 policy with immediate neighbours, such as Spain's cooperation with Morocco or
27 Italy with Libya, was insufficient. In our interviews, the Directorate General of Inter-
28 national Relations of the Spanish Ministry of Interior explained how the need to
29 "externalize" emerged after attempts to armour the border fences with high-
30 technology equipment proved to be inadequate in preventing the number and
31 diversity of border crossings. As a result, attempts to implement border control re-
32 gimes within GAM led Spanish authorities to expand their scope of operations from
33 fence and border patrols to include the tracking of multiple migrant itineraries.⁹

34 The concern for more effective border control led to a shift from pairs of police
35 officers patrolling small segments of a coastline on foot, to a hi-tech interface to
36 conduct real-time surveillance of large areas of the borderline. This was driven by
37 the need for a system of border management that responded to migrant move-
38 ments. Even then, technological upgrading was not enough. The approach had
39 to further evolve into one that focuses on tracing the migratory itinerary, scripting
40 these itineraries as "routes", and intercepting the migrants wherever they originate
41 or travel:

42
43 Not too long ago, the border used to be patrolled by two members of the Civil Guard
44 walking for hours along the beach. They would often be caught by surprise when spot-
45 ting ships only a few meters away from the coast. Nowadays, coastal border patrolling is
46 done by teams of Guardia Civil personnel seated in rooms with lots of radar screens and
47

1 when they see a ship, they click with the mouse and drag a helicopter, or whatever is
2 needed to that area. This sends a message to the concrete unit in the field to intervene
3 in a given exact location.

4 This development of technologically improving border patrolling has been done
5 adjusting ourselves to the new realities and necessities. Nonetheless, even this was
6 not enough. We needed to engage in a policy of stopping departures. It is better if
7 we have agents abroad that can alert us to what is happening and we can stop them
8 before they leave ... We had to go to the place where migration began in order to be
9 efficient. (Spanish Interior Ministry, Madrid, March 2012)

10 Both the Directorate General and the *Guardia Civil* acknowledge that their regula-
11 tory and interdiction efforts constantly have to adjust as migrant “routes” multiply,
12 their patterns shift, and new transit paths, facilitating nodes, and safe spaces open
13 up. Each is also clear that the goal of fully controlling irregular migration is
14 impossible:

15 We develop the security systems targeting certain “holes” in the line, and the migratory
16 flows change and are displaced and moved to other areas ... A good quality surveillance
17 system was first situated in the Gibraltar Straits. The migration flows changed towards
18 the East: Almeria, then Malaga ... then Ceuta and Melilla. This is something worrisome.
19 It is resolved with a political dialogue between Spain and Morocco. In two or three
20 months Morocco’s pressure on transit migrants squeezed the incoming sub-Saharan mi-
21 grants and the routes shifted to the Atlantic [to the Canary Islands].

22 In this new geography, we realized that our strategy had to be changed; we needed to
23 increase cooperation with third countries. The goal would then be to reduce migration
24 as much as possible, and the only way to be effective would be to cooperate with those
25 countries involved at the origin or in transit along these routes. Having surveillance and
26 patrolling your own coasts is not enough. (*Guardia Civil*, interview, Madrid, April 2012)

27 Instead, their new goal is to trace the routes and to follow them by creating ex-
28 tensive cooperation networks with other state authorities along those routes. This
29 has emerged as a more effective way of responding to the turbulent and shifting na-
30 ture of migratory routes, but it has also brought border policing into the heart of
31 the development challenge in very ambiguous ways.

32 ***GAM’s Three Pillars: Deepening the Net***

33 The attempt to spatially capture and harness the turbulence of migration via the
34 routes management strategy and its spatial classifications (origin–transit–destina-
35 tion) is intimately linked to the three policy pillars of GAM: (1) facilitating legal mi-
36 gration; (2) combatting irregular migration; and (3) promoting synergies between
37 migration and development. Attempts to map and fix the routes are translated via
38 these three pillars into categories of people and places with specific designations:
39 parsing (among others) legal, irregular transit, irregular, and refugee forms of mi-
40 gration, zones for development, potential recipients of remittance investment,
41 legal-skilled semi-permanent migration, legal circular migration for seasonal
42 migration, zones for development, potential recipients of remittance investment,
43 legal-skilled semi-permanent migration, legal circular migration for seasonal
44 migration, zones for development, potential recipients of remittance investment,
45 legal-skilled semi-permanent migration, legal circular migration for seasonal
46 migration, zones for development, potential recipients of remittance investment,
47 migration, zones for development, potential recipients of remittance investment,

1 labour, and readmission agreements for deportation. Through a series of bilateral
2 and multilateral state and public–private funded projects GAM simultaneously val-
3 idates and incorporates certain flows of bodies, and represses and ejects other
4 flows, even along the same route. One result has been the multiplication of catego-
5 ries of migrants, migratory groups and migratory spaces, each serving in specific
6 ways to shape new patterns of differential inclusion in the border regime (de Haas [Q13](#)
7 et al. 2012). This has occurred to such an extent that a specialty has emerged within
8 migration management policy termed “managing mixed flows” aimed at sifting
9 groups of arriving migrants into differentiated categories each with specific rights
10 (or lack thereof) and institutions charged with handling them (ICMPD 2007). In this [Q14](#)
11 sense, GAM is a holistic strategy to harness and manage the autonomy of migration
12 flows and dynamics more flexibly. Rather than “stopping” flows *tout court*, or bar-
13 ricading a national borderline, GAM incorporates recognition of the volatility and
14 elusiveness of migratory movements and adapts itself accordingly.

15 Border police and customs officials are ill-equipped to handle GAM’s third pillar
16 demands for border and migration management, a limit that poses serious chal-
17 lenges for the operational needs and implementation of GAM’s development goals.
18 Three consequences emerge. First, expatriates in Europe are increasingly being
19 scripted as engines of “development” in their role as “donors” of remittances.
20 Second, NGOs and humanitarian organizations have emerged as central actors in
21 third pillar development strategies. Third, “neighbouring” and “neighbours of
22 neighbouring” states are increasingly being tasked with responsibility for linking
23 border control and visa management with development assistance. The result is a
24 proliferation of migration management actors and agencies, as emigrant communi-
25 ties, development NGOs, and third states are articulated with EU institutions and
26 national border police, customs, and Ministries of Interior.

29 ***Attempting to Map the Routes***

30 These efforts to externalize border work have led to multi-year and multi-country
31 efforts to map these routes and create new spatial infrastructures for routes man-
32 agement. The intergovernmental process called *The Dialogue on Mediterranean*
33 *Transit Migration* is perhaps the clearest example. This dialogue initiated the I-Map
34 project of the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).¹⁰
35

36 I-Map is an interactive mapping of migration routes generally assumed to be di-
37 rected toward the EU. Its main impulse is to provide information and strategic sup-
38 port to the externalization process. I-Map was designed as a mechanism to facilitate
39 policy-maker education and police coordination in refocusing the monitoring and
40 management of migration flows toward different points of transit. It was designed
41 as an explicit response to the complexity and variability of migrant flows, and the
42 consequent need to manage “risk” in new ways. It advanced a new cartographic
43 thinking of the border, based on flows rather than hardening lines and a distinctive
44 way to operationalize border management. As an official from the EuropeAid
45 funding office stated: “[I-Map] provides a tool for partner countries to exchange in-
46 formation, in this way a new vision of the migration question [emerges] that allows
47

1 the border to be seen beyond a national frame or a sender/receiver frame”
2 (EuropeAid, interview, February 2011).

3 I-Map attempts to follow the evolution of trans-Saharan and trans-Mediterranean
4 migration routes from the early 2000s to the present, including graphs of
5 apprehended migrants and icons symbolizing bilateral or multilateral operations
6 on migration management and interception. As one of the coordinators of the
7 I-Map project at ICMPD explained: “The animation in I-Map shows how these
8 routes shift according to big political events or bi-lateral cooperation” (ICMPD, in-
9 terview, Vienna, September 2011). I-Map is interactive in the sense that it is regu-
10 larly updated and adjusted to the complex and turbulent flows of migration
11 streams themselves. In this sense, I-Map, and its linked Migrant Routes Strategy,
12 is a kind of adaptive modelling tool to track the ever-changing itineraries of mi-
13 grants and to create a platform for harmonizing border and migrant management
14 policies among participating states throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia.

15 This direct mapping of migrant routes is not the only goal of I-Map. In addition, it
16 seeks to be a common platform for information sharing among participating agen-
17 cies and states. The end goal is to regularize and harmonize policies and practices,
18 and to develop common and robust risk assessment tools. But its ancillary goal is to
19 ensure that its information sharing platform remains open and responsive to the
20 changing processes, patterns, and actors in the migration process. That is, in prac-
21 tice this formalization and harmonization model—while attempting to improve the
22 effectiveness of border management—also seeks to be a kind of echo chamber for
23 the indeterminacy of routes.

24 25 26 **Conclusion**

27 For every route they close, we will draw five more lines in the map! (Sans Papiers
28 Association of Zaragoza)

29
30 As the volume and variety of Euro-Mediterranean and East European migration
31 increased in the 1980s and 1990s EU officials, recognizing the limits of spatial
32 logics focused on borders and walls, began encouraging their colleagues and de-
33 partments to rethink their own approach to border control. The result was an ex-
34 pansion by the EU and its member states of the geographical scope of border
35 management well beyond the territorial limits of the EU and its member states.
36 This process—border externalization—is rapidly integrating diplomatic, military
37 and economic initiatives around unorthodox associational agreements and
38 implementing bodies among the European Union institutions, European member
39 states, non-EU countries, and new quasi-public institutions of research, manage-
40 ment, and policing.

41 If *operaismo*'s Copernican revolution was to invert capital-labour relations,
42 refocusing on the multiplication of labour struggles and the diverse mechanisms
43 capital employs to fix the social relation in its favour, AoM similarly seeks to focus
44 on the ways in which equivalent relations of *detrterritorialization by migrant mobilities*
45 are currently forcing the state to reterritorialize its border management regime.
46 Read in this manner, the Migration Route Strategy of GAM becomes a way to make
47

1 visible the *routes* and primary and secondary hubs of migrant movements. The
2 Routes Strategy categorizes, make transparent, and manages the unstable, mobile,
3 and differential spaces the “routes” traverse as “origins”, “transits” and “destina-
4 tions”, and in the process are creating new configurations of transnational institu-
5 tions and governance mechanisms (see Alioua 2013; de Haas 2007). In the
6 process, they are forcing a rethinking of the conventional meanings of sovereignty
7 and citizenship. As the three-part focus of GAM indicates, a more complex institu-
8 tional and legal geography is being constructed to both channel and combat the
9 diverse flows and forces of migrants.

10 Despite problems in implementation and shortcomings in the development of
11 the three pillars or the routes concept (European Commission, Directorate General
12 of Home Affairs 2011; MacKeller et al. 2010; Picard et al. 2009), the strategic vision Q15
13 of GAM today clearly demonstrates that a “fortification” approach toward migra-
14 tion is rapidly being supplemented in significant ways (Hess 2008; JHA, interview,
15 February 2011). Frameworks such as GAM reflect this process of externalization
16 as migration policy adapts to the uncertainties of actual migrant flows. According
17 to Hess et al. (2009:2): Q16

18 ... this post-national process of border displacement and externalization should not be
19 understood as a sovereign act whereby states extend power or competence on the basis
20 of an abstract claim for hegemony and control; rather it represents a multifaceted con-
21 stitutive plane of struggles where the regime of mobility control is challenged by the
22 fluid, clandestine, multidirectional, and context-dependent forms of mobility.

23 GAM responds to these turbulent geographies in an attempt to reorder and val-
24 orize an emerging architecture of multi-state practices that exercise new rights to
25 act along migratory routes beyond the practice of individual state sovereignties.
26 These *spatially mobile sovereignties* are certainly an extension of the state form, but
27 operating through multi-jurisdictional and joint actions in response to what Hess
28 (2008:3) has called “migration’s *unruliness*”. This emerging regime of border exter-
29 nalization and migration management is realigning notions of jurisdiction and ter-
30 ritoriality by creating a *transnational b/ordering assemblage*.¹¹ This multi-layered and
31 multi-scalar system of governance confronts migratory streams at different points
32 along their itinerary usually understood as having their goals as the EU, often well
33 before the physical limits of the EU itself.

34 In this paper we have made two main arguments. First, we have shown how the
35 autonomous practices of migrant lives and the demands they place on current im-
36 migration policies have led to a reformation of the EU border regime around a series
37 of externalization policies with their corresponding new institutions and spaces of
38 migration routes and nodes. Second, by focusing on these institutions and spaces
39 we have shown how border management regimes must constantly adapt to the di-
40 versities and excesses of migrant flows even as they consolidate and extended new
41 technologies and practices of regulation and control. That is, the autonomous force
42 of migration requires the constant reformulation of the spaces and practices of reg-
43 ulation and management. If a distinct and richer understanding of migrant rights
44 and a more open notion of citizenship are to be possible the dynamic and produc-
45 tive powers of ecologies of *mobile* existence and the effects of multiple itineraries of
46
47

1 people constantly on the move will have to drive the creation of new forms of pol-
 2 icy and border thinking.

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 22 couraging us to clarify some key lines of argument. The arguments and interpretations pre-
 23 sented here are solely the responsibility of the authors.

24 **Endnotes**

- 25 ¹ While Yann Moulier-Boutang is known for his work on cognitive capitalism in the Anglo-
 26 phone academy (see Moulier-Boutang 2011), he has been a reference for migration
 27 struggles inspired by his historical political economy of mobility (1998) and the concept
 28 of AoM that appeared in Italian in “Razza Operaia” (1992) and was then translated to
 29 German ([http://www.grundrisse.net/grundrisse34/interview_mit_yann_moulierbouta.](http://www.grundrisse.net/grundrisse34/interview_mit_yann_moulierbouta.htm)
 30 htm). AoM can be traced to his early work in the early 1980s on irregular migration
 31 (see Moulier-Boutang and Garson 1984).
- 32 ² See Casas et al. () for an engagement with these migrant practices and knowledges
 33 through a cartographic lens.
- 34 ³ Banner in German, Spanish and English by Zagaz, a Berlin-based feminist pro-migrant
 35 group demonstrating against the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm 2007 (see Heidenreich
 36 and Vukadinovic 2008:41).
- 37 ⁴ For a discussion of migration management as a strategy and its early formulation, see
 38 Geiger and Pecoud (2012) and Ghosh (2012).
- 39 ⁵ We use the word “routes” or “migratory routes” to refer to the spatial strategy developed
 40 by the EU and its member states in trying to channel or control migration. This follows the
 41 language of official documents that refer to a “Migratory Routes Strategy”. Critical migra-
 42 tion scholars also use the term to refer to migration that escapes state and capitalist control
 43 mechanism (see for example Papadopoulos et al. 2008).
- 44 ⁶ For a further engagement with the distinction between practices of citizenship versus citi-
 45 zenship as legal status, see Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013).
- 46 ⁷ GAM is not the first programmatic attempt to work with third countries on migration
 47 management. In many ways GAM develops out of the experience of the Tampere pro-
 gram on Justice and Home Affairs which is the first official EU wide program to tackle mi-
 gration in cooperation with third countries (CSES 2007b; Picard et al. 2009: 20).
- ⁸ The following quotation on the routes initiative helps to clarify GAM as well as how par-
 ticular member states were assigned specific responsibilities: “The overall Migration
 Routes Initiative identified four key migration routes from Africa to Europe determining

the presence of Immigration Liaison Officers along these routes. Reports on illegal immigration were drafted by these ILOs, which gave a picture of the situation in their respective countries and operational recommendations for stepping up cooperation along the routes. Meanwhile, Spain, France, Italy and the UK accepted leadership for each of the Regional Networks, and preparatory meetings got underway quickly. The Regional Networks will now work on developing an action plan for each route, consisting of concrete, operational projects that can be implemented to help combat illegal immigration” (Commission of the European Communities 2006:15).

- ⁹ These operations became known under the umbrella name of *Project Seahorse* and established the right for Spain and other EU states working through FRONTEX to intervene in conjunction with partner states in the territorial waters of several West African countries. This migration policing work continues now and has extended with an inland focus called the *West Sahel* project (see Casas et al. 2014).
- ¹⁰ See <http://www.imap-migration.org/index.php?id=1130> The I-Map is available for successive iterations at: <http://www.imap-migration.org/index.php?id=470&L> The ICMPD (founded in Vienna in 1993) was created to provide advice on migration and asylum issues and was one of the earliest institutions that proposed cooperation on border management between EU and non-EU countries.
- ¹¹ Here we draw on Houtum et al.’s (2005) reflections on borders as processes of ordering spaces and othering people—“b/ordering practices”. We use the phrase *transnational b/ordering assemblage* to refer to the growing global regime of migration management, where borders instead of being the concern of just one state, become control devices crisscrossing multiple territories and requiring high doses of inter-state coordination.

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
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
Required software to e-annotate PDFs: Adobe Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader (version 7.0 or above). (Note that this document uses screenshots from Adobe Reader X)

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Once you have Acrobat Reader open on your computer, click on the [Comment](#) tab at the right of the toolbar:



This will open up a panel down the right side of the document. The majority of tools you will use for annotating your proof will be in the [Annotations](#) section, pictured opposite. We've picked out some of these tools below:




1. Replace (Ins) Tool – for replacing text.



Strikes a line through text and opens up a text box where replacement text can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Replace \(Ins\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type the replacement text into the blue box that appears.




2. Strikethrough (Del) Tool – for deleting text.



Strikes a red line through text that is to be deleted.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Strikethrough \(Del\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.



3. Add note to text Tool – for highlighting a section to be changed to bold or italic.




Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box where comments can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight the relevant section of text.
- Click on the [Add note to text](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type instruction on what should be changed regarding the text into the yellow box that appears.

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
4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at specific points in the text.



Marks a point in the proof where a comment needs to be highlighted.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add sticky note](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click at the point in the proof where the comment should be inserted.
- Type the comment into the yellow box that appears.



USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION


5. Attach File Tool – for inserting large amounts of text or replacement figures.



Inserts an icon linking to the attached file in the appropriate place in the text.

How to use it

- Click on the [Attach File](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click on the proof to where you'd like the attached file to be linked.
- Select the file to be attached from your computer or network.
- Select the colour and type of icon that will appear in the proof. Click OK.



6. Add stamp Tool – for approving a proof if no corrections are required.




Inserts a selected stamp onto an appropriate place in the proof.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add stamp](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Select the stamp you want to use. (The [Approved](#) stamp is usually available directly in the menu that appears).
- Click on the proof where you'd like the stamp to appear. (Where a proof is to be approved as it is, this would normally be on the first page).

of the business cycle, starting with the
 on perfect competition, constant return
 production. In this environment goods
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


7. Drawing Markups Tools – for drawing shapes, lines and freeform annotations on proofs and commenting on these marks.

Allows shapes, lines and freeform annotations to be drawn on proofs and for comment to be made on these marks..

How to use it

- Click on one of the shapes in the [Drawing Markups](#) section.
- Click on the proof at the relevant point and draw the selected shape with the cursor.
- To add a comment to the drawn shape, move the cursor over the shape until an arrowhead appears.
- Double click on the shape and type any text in the red box that appears.



For further information on how to annotate proofs, click on the [Help](#) menu to reveal a list of further options:

