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<dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:invenio="http://invenio-software.org/elements/1.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:identifier>doi:10.26754/ojs_arif/arif.202227307</dc:identifier><dc:language>spa</dc:language><dc:creator>Mayoral, Juan Vicente</dc:creator><dc:title>The signposts of inquiry: Dewey’s logic and Kuhn’s philosophy of science</dc:title><dc:identifier>ART-2022-142375</dc:identifier><dc:description>In this article, I review John Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in order to show some points of coincidence with the work of a later author: Thomas S. Kuhn. I support the view that despite the disparities that their works sometimes show—and the reservations that Kuhn himself had about Dewey’s work—there are interesting coincidental points that help to offer a common standpoint that goes against more traditional views on logic, inquiry and scientific methodology. I focus on three main aspects: the contextual and social nature of logic; the significance they both grant to problem-solving contexts; and their convergence on a developmental view of the progress of knowledge.</dc:description><dc:date>2022</dc:date><dc:source>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/150043</dc:source><dc:doi>10.26754/ojs_arif/arif.202227307</dc:doi><dc:identifier>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/150043</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>oai:zaguan.unizar.es:150043</dc:identifier><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN/FFI2017-84781-P</dc:relation><dc:identifier.citation>Análisis (Zaragoza) 9, 2 (2022), 351-379</dc:identifier.citation><dc:rights>by-nc-nd</dc:rights><dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es</dc:rights><dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights></dc:dc>

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