000153650 001__ 153650
000153650 005__ 20251017144557.0
000153650 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.3934/jdg.2025001
000153650 0248_ $$2sideral$$a143782
000153650 037__ $$aART-2025-143782
000153650 041__ $$aeng
000153650 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-0679-6340$$aAndaluz, Joaquín$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000153650 245__ $$aStatic and dynamic approaches to corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool
000153650 260__ $$c2025
000153650 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000153650 5203_ $$aThe aim of this paper is to analyze corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool for firms competing in the market from both static and dynamic perspectives. We analyze competition in a context of strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly model with homogeneous product, linear demand and constant marginal costs. Firm owners can delegate decisions regarding the quantity produced to their managers using two incentive schemes: one based on a convex linear combination of profits and revenues, and the other on a linear combination of profits and consumer surplus. By resolving the proposed sequential game, we conclude that owners set a social objective for their managers. Furthermore, by introducing the time perspective to the quantity competition stage, we show that the Cournot–Nash equilibrium may become unstable when at least one of the agents adjusts quantities according to an expectations scheme based on marginal utility. An excessively high adjustment speed can lead to a cascade of bifurcations with increasingly complex attractors.
000153650 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2022-140010OB-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/S40-23R
000153650 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aAll rights reserved$$uhttp://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/
000153650 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
000153650 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-6267-990X$$aJarne, Gloria$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000153650 7102_ $$14000$$2415$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Análisis Económico$$cÁrea Fund. Análisis Económico
000153650 773__ $$g(2025), [30 pp.]$$pJ. dyn. games$$tJournal of Dynamics and Games$$x2164-6066
000153650 8564_ $$s592752$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/153650/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint
000153650 8564_ $$s1521390$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/153650/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint
000153650 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:153650$$particulos$$pdriver
000153650 951__ $$a2025-10-17-14:13:31
000153650 980__ $$aARTICLE