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    <subfield code="a">Andaluz, Joaquín</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
    <subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0002-0679-6340</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Static and dynamic approaches to corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">2025</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">The aim of this paper is to analyze corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool for firms competing in the market from both static and dynamic perspectives. We analyze competition in a context of strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly model with homogeneous product, linear demand and constant marginal costs. Firm owners can delegate decisions regarding the quantity produced to their managers using two incentive schemes: one based on a convex linear combination of profits and revenues, and the other on a linear combination of profits and consumer surplus. By resolving the proposed sequential game, we conclude that owners set a social objective for their managers. Furthermore, by introducing the time perspective to the quantity competition stage, we show that the Cournot–Nash equilibrium may become unstable when at least one of the agents adjusts quantities according to an expectations scheme based on marginal utility. An excessively high adjustment speed can lead to a cascade of bifurcations with increasingly complex attractors.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Jarne, Gloria</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Universidad de Zaragoza</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">Dpto. Análisis Económico</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">Área Fund. Análisis Económico</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="g">(2025), [30 pp.]</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">J. dyn. games</subfield>
    <subfield code="t">Journal of Dynamics and Games</subfield>
    <subfield code="x">2164-6066</subfield>
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