000165644 001__ 165644
000165644 005__ 20260113234334.0
000165644 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3
000165644 0248_ $$2sideral$$a98998
000165644 037__ $$aART-2018-98998
000165644 041__ $$aeng
000165644 100__ $$aCandel-Sánchez, F.
000165644 245__ $$aEndogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
000165644 260__ $$c2018
000165644 5203_ $$aThis paper aims at explaining industry protection in a context in which the government cannot observe the state of market demand. We develop an asymmetric information model and use the tools of contract theory in order to understand (1) how the level of industry protection is endogenously determined, and (2) why some industries decide to engage in large lobbying costs to become politically active. Our model offers plausible explanations to phenomena such as the “loser’s paradox”, where weak industries receive the most protection although strong industries are the ones that spend more resources on lobbying activities. The model also allows for an analysis of the influence that lobbying costs have on the decision to organize actively as a lobby.
000165644 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2013-44483-P
000165644 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess$$aAll rights reserved$$uhttp://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/
000165644 590__ $$a1.141$$b2018
000165644 591__ $$aECONOMICS$$b198 / 363 = 0.545$$c2018$$dQ3$$eT2
000165644 592__ $$a0.549$$b2018
000165644 593__ $$aEconomics and Econometrics$$c2018$$dQ1
000165644 593__ $$aBusiness, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)$$c2018$$dQ1
000165644 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
000165644 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-7281-9523$$aPerote-Peña, J.$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000165644 7102_ $$14000$$2415$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Análisis Económico$$cÁrea Fund. Análisis Económico
000165644 773__ $$g123 (2018), 23 - 47$$pJ. econ.$$tJournal of Economics$$x0931-8658
000165644 8564_ $$s561297$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/165644/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada
000165644 8564_ $$s1072168$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/165644/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada
000165644 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:165644$$particulos$$pdriver
000165644 951__ $$a2026-01-13-22:04:52
000165644 980__ $$aARTICLE