000169452 001__ 169452
000169452 005__ 20260227133540.0
000169452 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.ecolecon.2025.108903
000169452 0248_ $$2sideral$$a148352
000169452 037__ $$aART-2025-148352
000169452 041__ $$aeng
000169452 100__ $$aJia, Xiangyu
000169452 245__ $$aAlienable or inalienable, and how? Individual property rights in commons governance
000169452 260__ $$c2025
000169452 5203_ $$aAmid increasing natural resource privatization, the proper delineation of individual property rights and their alienability, i.e. the possibility to transfer them, and effectively hybridizing market and community governance are of utmost importance. Here, we investigate how community-based institutional arrangements evolve with market mechanisms to achieve sustainable resource management. We examine the grazing quota system developed within a common property regime on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau over the past two decades. Using the Calabresi & Melamed framework, we chronologically divide the institutional process into three stages: (1) introduction of non-transferable grazing quotas (inalienability), (2) market tradable quotas (property rules), and (3) alienable quotas through a village collective-based compensation mechanism (liability rules). By assessing social-ecological performance and conducting a qualitative analysis of transaction costs, we analyze how these three institutions evolved and what outcomes they produced. We find that quota alienability doesn't increase grazing intensity. Furthermore, quota transfers under liability rules, instead of property rules, exhibit better social outcomes through improving distributive equity, because the collectively managed compensation mechanism entails lower transaction costs. The findings demonstrate quotas under liability rules as a feasible pathway for integrating elements of individual alienable property rights into community-based natural resource management and achieve sustainability.
000169452 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess$$aAll rights reserved$$uhttp://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/
000169452 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
000169452 700__ $$aWei, Yiran
000169452 700__ $$aZhang, Zhiqi
000169452 700__ $$aZeren, Gongbu
000169452 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-0715-0418$$aPérez-Ibarra, Irene$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000169452 700__ $$aVillamayor-Tomas, Sergio
000169452 700__ $$aLi, Wenjun
000169452 7102_ $$15011$$2235$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. CC.Agrar.y Medio Natural$$cÁrea Econom.Sociol.Polit.Agra.
000169452 773__ $$g242 (2025), 108903 [11 pp.]$$pEcol. econ.$$tECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS$$x0921-8009
000169452 8564_ $$s1688650$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/169452/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada$$zinfo:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2027-12-22
000169452 8564_ $$s2545129$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/169452/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada$$zinfo:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2027-12-22
000169452 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:169452$$particulos$$pdriver
000169452 951__ $$a2026-02-27-12:35:57
000169452 980__ $$aARTICLE