doi:10.36576/2660-955X.53.231engPérez Chico, Davidmetascepticism and the traditional epistemological project: Sosa and Stroud on standards of successART-2026-148489The exchange between Ernest Sosa and Barry Stroud on the possibility of a theory of knowledge is usually treated as a quarrel about epistemic circularity. I argue that it is better understood as a clash over standards of success for epistemology. On Sosa’s virtue perspectivism, reliability and apt belief fix the aim of epistemology. On Stroud’s view, philosophical success requires first-person accessibility and non-circular understanding. The dispute about circularity is therefore derivative. Drawing on Pérez Chico and Sanfélix’s notion of metascepticism, I propose an operational test that distinguishes genuine reform from metascepticism in the strict sense. The result is a way of classifying positions that clarifies what success in epistemology can coherently amount to.2026http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/17000610.36576/2660-955X.53.231http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/170006oai:zaguan.unizar.es:170006info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-142120NB-I00info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-14892NB-I00Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 53 (2026), 231-245byhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess