170006 20260316092629.0 doi 10.36576/2660-955X.53.231 sideral 148489 ART-2026-148489 eng Pérez Chico, David Universidad de Zaragoza (orcid)0000-0001-7933-8861 metascepticism and the traditional epistemological project: Sosa and Stroud on standards of success 2026 The exchange between Ernest Sosa and Barry Stroud on the possibility of a theory of knowledge is usually treated as a quarrel about epistemic circularity. I argue that it is better understood as a clash over standards of success for epistemology. On Sosa’s virtue perspectivism, reliability and apt belief fix the aim of epistemology. On Stroud’s view, philosophical success requires first-person accessibility and non-circular understanding. The dispute about circularity is therefore derivative. Drawing on Pérez Chico and Sanfélix’s notion of metascepticism, I propose an operational test that distinguishes genuine reform from metascepticism in the strict sense. The result is a way of classifying positions that clarifies what success in epistemology can coherently amount to. Access copy available to the general public Unrestricted info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-142120NB-I00 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-14892NB-I00 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess by https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 5012 585 Universidad de Zaragoza Unidad Predepartam. Filosofía Área Lógica y Filosof.Ciencia 53 (2026), 231-245 Cuad. salmant. filos. Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 0210-4857 272467 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/170006/files/texto_completo.pdf Versión publicada 1133737 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/170006/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon icon Versión publicada oai:zaguan.unizar.es:170006 articulos driver 2026-03-16-08:16:41 ARTICLE