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<dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:invenio="http://invenio-software.org/elements/1.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:identifier>doi:10.1038/s41598-026-49942-w</dc:identifier><dc:language>eng</dc:language><dc:creator>Abián, David</dc:creator><dc:creator>Bernad, Jorge</dc:creator><dc:creator>Ilarri, Sergio</dc:creator><dc:creator>Trillo-Lado, Raquel</dc:creator><dc:title>Individual and collective gains from cooperation and reciprocity in a dynamic-network Prisoner’s Dilemma driven by extraversion, openness, and agreeableness</dc:title><dc:identifier>ART-2026-149247</dc:identifier><dc:description>How do stable personality differences shape cooperation when social ties can form and dissolve? We model a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma on an endogenous network in which three continuous Big Five traits map to transparent local mechanisms: Extraversion sets a target number of partners, Openness determines how broadly agents search beyond friends-of-friends, and Agreeableness sets a baseline willingness to cooperate. At each encounter, agents combine this baseline with the partner’s directly observed history; there are no trait labels, gossip, or global reputations. Ties form when agents are under-connected and are cut when they become over-connected, with cuts prioritising partners who have defected more often. We vary network size (N=30–200), population composition, and the balance between trait-driven and history-driven behaviour. Three robust patterns emerge. First, cooperate first, then reciprocate—high initial willingness to cooperate combined with history-sensitive response—produces systems that are simultaneously more prosperous, fairer, and safer. Second, personality has predictable conditional effects: Agreeableness helps when history matters but hurts when behaviour is mostly trait-driven; Extraversion amplifies the environment; Openness has little net payoff effect. Third, the network reorganises accordingly: degree assortativity stays near zero, whereas agreeable agents increasingly connect to one another when cooperation takes hold.</dc:description><dc:date>2026</dc:date><dc:source>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/171252</dc:source><dc:doi>10.1038/s41598-026-49942-w</dc:doi><dc:identifier>http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/171252</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>oai:zaguan.unizar.es:171252</dc:identifier><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2020-113037RB-I00</dc:relation><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2020-113903RB-I00</dc:relation><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/T42-23R</dc:relation><dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/T64-23R</dc:relation><dc:identifier.citation>Scientific reports (Nature Publishing Group) (2026), [14 pp.]</dc:identifier.citation><dc:rights>by</dc:rights><dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es</dc:rights><dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights></dc:dc>

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