000171636 001__ 171636 000171636 005__ 20260527123126.0 000171636 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.cose.2026.104958 000171636 0248_ $$2sideral$$a149361 000171636 037__ $$aART-2026-149361 000171636 041__ $$aeng 000171636 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-0365-6702$$aAparicio-Téllez, Raúl$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000171636 245__ $$aPUF optimization for IoT device authentication 000171636 260__ $$c2026 000171636 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000171636 5203_ $$aTwo critical aspects in IoT are security and resource consumption. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware security primitives that exploit the inherent manufacturing variations of integrated circuits to generate unique identifiers. Due to their uniqueness and resistance to cloning, they are widely used for IoT device authentication. In this work, a novel approach to enhance the identifiability of compensated measurement PUFs is introduced. This method involves applying specific weight masks to the parameters extracted from the PUF entropy source before conducting comparisons to determine the output bit. This technique has been tested on several types of PUFs constructed using public datasets. As a result, it has been observed that the Equal Error Rate (EER) can be greatly improved, up to two orders of magnitude. The main advantage of this technique is that it does not modify the architecture of the compensated measurement PUF (which is interesting for IoT devices, as it does not require extra resources), while it also has proven to be generalizable, i.e., the optimal mask parameters can be found using a small set of devices and, then, generalized to a different bigger set of devices. This way, this proposal contributes to the development of novel authentication schemes for IoT devices, addressing both security and resource efficiency, critical issues in IoT environments. 000171636 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2020-114110RA-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2023-150244OB-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/PID2024-157204OA-I00$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/UZ/CUD2026-07$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/UZ/UZ2024-IyA-01 000171636 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es 000171636 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 000171636 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-8648-6248$$aGarcia-Bosque, Miguel$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000171636 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-9131-0861$$aDíez-Señorans, Guillermo 000171636 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-2874-6368$$aAldea, Concepcion$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000171636 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-0182-7723$$aCelma, Santiago$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000171636 7102_ $$15008$$2250$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Ingeniería Electrón.Com.$$cÁrea Electrónica 000171636 773__ $$g168 (2026), 104958 [13 pp.]$$pComput. secur.$$tCOMPUTERS & SECURITY$$x0167-4048 000171636 8564_ $$s2725291$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/171636/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada 000171636 8564_ $$s2718526$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/171636/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada 000171636 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:171636$$particulos$$pdriver 000171636 951__ $$a2026-05-27-11:25:28 000171636 980__ $$aARTICLE