000060413 001__ 60413
000060413 005__ 20251113150201.0
000060413 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1103/PhysRevE.94.062315
000060413 0248_ $$2sideral$$a97823
000060413 037__ $$aART-2016-97823
000060413 041__ $$aeng
000060413 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-1192-8707$$aAleta, A.$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000060413 245__ $$aFrom degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity for an optimal resolution of social dilemmas
000060413 260__ $$c2016
000060413 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted
000060413 5203_ $$aAn active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner''s dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.
000060413 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/FIS2014-55867-P$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/317532/EU/Foundational Research on MULTIlevel comPLEX networks and systems/MULTIPLEX
000060413 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es
000060413 590__ $$a2.366$$b2016
000060413 591__ $$aPHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL$$b6 / 55 = 0.109$$c2016$$dQ1$$eT1
000060413 591__ $$aPHYSICS, FLUIDS & PLASMAS$$b10 / 30 = 0.333$$c2016$$dQ2$$eT2
000060413 592__ $$a1.27$$b2016
000060413 593__ $$aCondensed Matter Physics$$c2016$$dQ1
000060413 593__ $$aStatistics and Probability$$c2016$$dQ1
000060413 593__ $$aStatistical and Nonlinear Physics$$c2016$$dQ1
000060413 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
000060413 700__ $$aMeloni, S.
000060413 700__ $$aPerc, M.
000060413 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-0895-1893$$aMoreno, Y.$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza
000060413 7102_ $$12004$$2405$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Física Teórica$$cÁrea Física Teórica
000060413 773__ $$g94, 6 (2016), 062315 [8 pp.]$$pPhys. rev., E$$tPhysical Review E$$x2470-0045
000060413 8564_ $$s2970951$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/60413/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada
000060413 8564_ $$s133818$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/60413/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada
000060413 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:60413$$particulos$$pdriver
000060413 951__ $$a2025-11-13-15:00:35
000060413 980__ $$aARTICLE