000070894 001__ 70894 000070894 005__ 20191122145054.0 000070894 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1038/s41598-018-19503-x 000070894 0248_ $$2sideral$$a106370 000070894 037__ $$aART-2018-106370 000070894 041__ $$aeng 000070894 100__ $$aHan, X. 000070894 245__ $$aEqual status in Ultimatum Games promotes rational sharing 000070894 260__ $$c2018 000070894 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000070894 5203_ $$aExperiments on the Ultimatum Game (UG) repeatedly show that people''s behaviour is far from rational. In UG experiments, a subject proposes how to divide a pot and the other can accept or reject the proposal, in which case both lose everything. While rational people would offer and accept the minimum possible amount, in experiments low offers are often rejected and offers are typically larger than the minimum, and even fair. Several theoretical works have proposed that these results may arise evolutionarily when subjects act in both roles and there is a fixed interaction structure in the population specifying who plays with whom. We report the first experiments on structured UG with subjects playing simultaneously both roles. We observe that acceptance levels of responders approach rationality and proposers accommodate their offers to their environment. More precisely, subjects keep low acceptance levels all the time, but as proposers they follow a best-response-like approach to choose their offers. We thus find that status equality promotes rational sharing while the influence of structure leads to fairer offers compared to well-mixed populations. Our results are far from what is observed in single-role UG experiments and largely different from available predictions based on evolutionary game theory. 000070894 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/FIS2015-64349-P$$9This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No H2020 662725-IBSEN$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/662725/EU/Bridging the gap: from Individual Behaviour to the Socio-tEchnical MaN/IBSEN$$9This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No H2020 640772-DOLFINS$$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/640772/EU/Distributed Global Financial Systems for Society/DOLFINS 000070894 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ 000070894 590__ $$a4.011$$b2018 000070894 591__ $$aMULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES$$b14 / 69 = 0.203$$c2018$$dQ1$$eT1 000070894 592__ $$a1.414$$b2018 000070894 593__ $$aMultidisciplinary$$c2018$$dQ1 000070894 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 000070894 700__ $$aCao, S. 000070894 700__ $$aBao, J.-Z. 000070894 700__ $$aWang, W.-X. 000070894 700__ $$aZhang, B. 000070894 700__ $$aGao, Z.-Y. 000070894 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-1874-2881$$aSánchez, A. 000070894 773__ $$g8, 1 (2018), 122 [8 pp]$$pSci. rep.$$tSCIENTIFIC REPORTS$$x2045-2322 000070894 8564_ $$s1172555$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/70894/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada 000070894 8564_ $$s111274$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/70894/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada 000070894 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:70894$$particulos$$pdriver 000070894 951__ $$a2019-11-22-14:44:54 000070894 980__ $$aARTICLE