

CRIP POSTHUMANISM AND NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN
POSTANTROPOCENTRISM: KEYS TO A BODILY PERSPECTIVE IN SCIENCE.

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Abstract

From its origins, the dominant thought in the Western Culture, put the soul first and despised the body, generating distinctions and hierarchies in which the spiritual or immaterial was considered superior to the corporal or material. But the bodies, far from conforming to this, have not allowed themselves to be reduced to these dichotomous patterns. The queer, turning their complex identity around, discovered the body, worked with it, but returned to the field of immateriality in which the identity is lodged, although populated with hybridizations and transversalities. The crip movement have completed the gesture of the queer entering fully into the field of the body, denaturalizing categories that were anchored to him, such as deficiency or disability, and interpreting it as radically interdependent. However, in the absence of tradition in dealing with the body, both in reflection and politics, we are inspired by other cultures that always put corporality in the foreground to go in search of the body that the West Culture lost. The Native American Indians are explicit in terms of contrast between humans and non-humans, it follows that for them there is a unique culture with multiple natures, as opposed to Western, because it believes in plurality of cultures and in a uniform nature. In order to coexist with this diversity, the West has invented "cultural relativism" and "multiculturalism", while the Native American Indians have developed a "multinaturalism" with their "perspectivism". We propose to denominate perspectivism a modality of science and politics that could manifest the radical influence of bodies in the world.

Key words: perspectivism, science, politics, post humanism, postantropocentrism

1. INTRODUCTION

Rorty's "linguistic turn" (1967) began a certain postmodernity (Lyotard, 1982) suggesting that truths are not absolute but instead the result of certain language games. The second cybernetic (Von Foerster, 1991), on the other hand, underpinned another particular constructivism, asserting that there is no outside world independent of the observer but instead invented by observation based on distinctions and indications (Spencer Brown, 1991). Geertz (1988) also stated that knowledge of other cultures is between difficult and impossible because the most qualified professional, the anthropologist, is unable to see and interpret outside the intellectual categories provided by his society, so that "others" are only a mirror and the reflections that it inspires actually speak of us. Finally, the network actor theory (Latour, 2005) has added the idea that the natural objects that science deals with are constructed by the complex interrelationship of a broad set of actors that mobilize a large amount of resources in different ways. In short, according to these and other lines of reflection, we discover that the world that our civilization imagined as exterior and objective has actually been invented by us. Well, to this linguistic, cultural, neuronal and social shift that has changed our idea of the world, we have added a complete change in direction that aims to awaken our relationship with its sensitive

side. With the first movement there was only a change of hierarchy in the subtle scope or ideas, whereas with the second one we have made our way to the sensitive or material slope. If the first gesture is post-modern, since it only alters or destroys the idea of objectivity, the second is post-western because it questions the protagonism that since Greek times was given to the soul and subordination that was adjudged to the body ¹.

In this article we are going to explore the second gesture using two novel approaches to corporality. On the one hand, *crip* theory, the continuation at another level of corporal awakening that promoted the *queer* theory. On the other hand, the complex corporal experience that the Native American Indians practice according to Viveiros de Castro's analysis (2006, 2010, 2013). We believe that the corporal awakening that the *crip* theory promotes from a particular area, although forceful, lacks the experience and encouragement that the Native American Indians can provide to deepen the attempt and to extend it to more social scopes and corners.

From a post humanist point of view Braidotti (2015, p. 83) has suggested that "if the decay of humanism started post humanism by exhorting the humanized and racialized humans to emancipate themselves from the master-slave dialectic relationship, the *anthropos* crisis paved the way for the demonic emergence of the naturalized others. " In our view, the post-human component of the *crip* movement, which is responsible for promoting the definitive overflow of a certain kind of subject (the corporally normalized one from a closed set of functionalities), can be expanded through the particular Native American Indians experience in relation to the treatment with those that our civilization considers as animals. Such is the relationship we seek to establish between such seemingly distinct discourses. It will be up to the reader to judge the success of this attempt.

2. QUEERS AND CRIPS.

The body is the space of social integration par excellence, but at the same time it is also of social exclusion (Planella, 2006). The representation of difference as a deviation and the discourses that legitimize such a process, are the keys to the incorporation and subordination of bodies.

The subjects are examined, classified, ordered, named and defined by the marks that have been attributed to their bodies from the comparison with a certain idea or norm of a body that acts as a general equivalent², allowing them to project meaning and value onto the concrete bodies, in addition to deciding the position of the subjects that carry them (Louro, 2003). Such marks have defined these subjects in their entirety through concepts that derive from dichotomous categorizations whose central axis are abstract and universal norms that, on the other hand, need to be

¹ Which had many consequences. One of them is the separation and later exclusion of animals for not reaching our level of intelligence (Simondon, 2008). Descartes closed the operation even depriving them of instinct.

² This hierarchical way of proceeding should not be surprising since the devices responsible for thinking and ordering the sexuality hierarchy and give meaning to the erogenous zones apart from the general penis equivalent, in the field of coins the same thing happens with the general dollar equivalent, in classical organizations with the equivalent general boss, in the traditional families with the equivalent general father, etc. (Goux, 2000).

reiterated to produce what they name. One of the results of the operation will be the production of normal and abnormal bodies. However, this order never ends because bodies are never completely reduced to the norms, categorizations and projections of sense or value that they receive. With varying intensity and regularity, they tend to overflow all of these complex construction norms, denouncing in this way, in fact, their fiction and, at the same time, illuminating the possibility of inventing other fundamentals for corporality.

The bodies that because of their difference to the norm have been hypercorporalized and excluded are defined as ugly, dirty, impure, sick or, in short, abject, and belong to the category of "others", which are necessary to construct the social order and generate effective plans in the exercise of standardizing and sanctioning the different (Young, 2000) (Platero and Rosón, 2012). But these bodies, far from resigning themselves to supposed victimization of their subordinate position, claim precisely what the dominant culture has taught them to despise and thus the bodies that have been regulated according to their non-normative sexuality or those that have been cataloged according to their "abnormal" organs or capacities, have "subverted the stigma using the negative denomination that has been assigned to them to dominate it, display it and to turn it into a symbol of pride" (Shakespeare, 2008, p. 74).

2.1. *Queer bodies*

This is what happens with the term *queer*, initially used in a derogatory way, as an insult, towards people with sexualities not included in the correct social order, but later used by the same recipients of the stigma to make it a stronger term. *Queer* means "strange" or "weird", and has been translated into terms like "poof", "fag", "bent", "faggot", etc. Due to the difficulty of finding a term that does not refer only to the sexualities or not only to men, the term *queer* is used without translation, this is the reason why in Spanish it loses the meaning of an insult that does exist in the common use of the English language and also the ingenious reappropriation which the stigmatized body has been subject to (Guzmán and Platero, 2014). However, in recent years this term has undergone an increasing process of commodification and is also becoming a kind of rule, so it runs the risk of generating new exclusions, thus disfiguring the specific conditions of oppression of transsexual, transgender, disabled or racialized bodies. In order to avoid this (repeat) fall in the nefarious effects of the norm, at present it tends to speak of transfeminisms (Preciado, 2008) (Medeak, 2014). The prefix "trans" refers to something that is going through what it names. Applied to feminisms, it is a transit, a transformation that has micro political implications (Sayak-Valencia, 2014). The subjects of transfeminism can be understood as a kind of *queer* multitudes luck that, taking advantage of their intersectionality conditions, achieve non-standardized local agendas capable of breaking up the ways in which subjectivity is produced today on a planetary scale (Sayak-Valencia, 2014).

The history of this intellectual and political gesture began at the end of the 1980's, when some groups (lesbians, chicanas, blacks, transsexuals, etc.) reacted against gay identity policies that demanded integration into a heterosexual dominant society, "using the street as a space for public theatre to show exclusion and using insulting language to claim resistance to the heterosexual norm" (Preciado, 2008, p.236) (Louro, 2001). At the same time, criticism also reached feminism, due to the

fact that from its dissenting slopes the political subject of feminism, women, understood as a predefined biological reality and, above all, the feminine feminism of more institutional (white, western, heterosexual, abled and middle-class) is questioned, as well as the categories that are understood and considered obvious. In fact, if gender is nothing more than imitation and ritualized repetition of what has been divided and hierarchized by calling it "feminine" and "masculine," as we know from Simone De Beauvoir, and sex is a normative ideal, a regulatory practice which produces and differentiates the bodies it governs, as Foucault and Butler showed us among other things, therefore sexuality (homo, hetero, etc.) cannot and will not be anchored to any naturalized category (Butler, 2002). In this way the sex-gender-sexuality equation is broken and with it the identities that allowed it to construct explode (first the classic male-masculine-heterosexual and female-feminine-heterosexual- but later others male-feminine-homosexual, female-masculine-homosexual etc..) and become complicated and coimplicated (Britzman, 2002) (Morris, 2005) (Louro, 2001). In short, the categories of sex, gender and sexuality, which are basic in the construction of any instituted order, are disconnected, constructing a scattered and heterogeneous space in which identity becomes terribly problematic, not to say useless.

But in this journey through turbulent waters of identity initiated by feminism and culminated by post-feminism, *queer* activism and transfeminism there is a problem. It is the emergence of the body, recognized as fundamental in the problem identification of identity, but not yet seen as a gateway to another way of understanding individual and collective existence. The *crip* theory appeared to make this leap.

2.2. *Crip* Bodies.

Crip, in slang is a diminutive of the term cripple, used as an insult to people with functional diversity³, which has been translated as "crippled" but can refer to other words with a similar, though more specific, meaning used in everyday culture, such is the case of "lame", "one-eyed", "humpbacked", "dwarf", etc. (Guzmán *et al.*, 2014). This term, *crip*, which initially denotes hostility, has helped by means of its re-appropriation of stigmatized subjects, generate culture, make jokes, etc. And in a similar way as the *queer* movement did in its re-appropriation of the insult (and blacks making the contemptuous *nigger* its own), it has facilitated the creation of a sensibility that destabilizes the values and normativity of the organically and functionally standardized body (Platero *et al.*, 2012). Although this term does not appear in the academic scope in reference to the theory until the 2006 publication of the book "*Crip Theory: Cultural signs of Queerness and Disability*", written by Robert McRuer,

³ It refers to people with different biophysical characteristics and given the environment conditions generated by society, must perform the same tasks or functions as the rest of society in a different way. Same function, but different way of doing it. "This term considers the difference of the person and the lack of respect of the majorities, which in their social and environmental constructive processes does not take into account this functional diversity" (Romañach and Lobato, 2005, p.4). This term was coined by the Independent Living Forum (Spain) in 2005 and is currently used to refer to disability in our context.

precursor of this theory, the use of the term *crip* was certainly already being used in the 1990s, as can be seen in the documentary "*Vital Signs: Crip Culture Talks Back*".

Starting from the unsacred towards the medical model of disability (that uses rehabilitation to resemble an ideally healthy and capable body, which is considered universal) and emphasizing the huge social model gaps (that treated disability like a constructed social category but forgot its group, its diversity and its multifunctionality), the *crips* or cripples began to generate criticism of body patterns in the 1990's. If the disability is only the result of social and environmental restrictions that incapacitate certain bodies and the deficiency is a simple and aseptic statistical deviation to which meaning has been granted through the use of naturalization (which is normal in the legitimation of so many conventions - from the nation to the family - taking care of biological aspects), vulnerability can no longer be associated to a list or catalog of naturalized characteristics. The disability-deficiency relationship is thus broken, and autonomy, which was believed to be immanent to human beings, no longer finds categories in which to anchor itself. Thus, there is an understanding of the human being as radically interdependent, in need of others and the environment.

2.3. Genealogy of the organic and functionally normative body

The body, bearer of differences, became something to be regulated, an object of knowledge and control in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, (Rodriguez & Ferreira, 2010). At that time, in which a certain ideal of being human is naturalized, living was distributed in a domain of value and utility (Foucault, 1976). For this, the norm, understood under the criteria of qualification and coercion, is imposed on the bodies (Canguilhem, 1972). The body is tied to two forms of regulation, a medical one and another aesthetic of perfection one, which makes the body, or a certain ideal body, something that every human being should imitate (Ferreira, 2008; Ferreira, 2009). In order to regulate particular bodies and control the differences with reference to a normative corpus, positive techniques will be applied to classify, divide and subdivide them in order to individualize them (Foucault, 2007).

The tare, the difference that from this time is understood as a deviation from the norm, is regulated, and the body that carries it, classified as disabled, will be disciplined. In view of the new relations of production / reproduction and referring to health as a norm, the health-deficiency dichotomy will be generated, categorizing bodies from an organic ideal, naming them or classifying them according to a state of health regulated and disciplined by the expert (medical) opinion that erects organic norms or normality (unlimited, unrestricted and efficient) (Rodriguez and Ferreira, 2010). On the other hand, referring to capacity, the dichotomy is generated between efficient functioning or capacity and inefficient functioning or disability, without considering less habitual forms of functionings that develop those capacities and that due to normative procedure confuse capacity with functionality. In turn, these categories generated the dichotomy organism (health-deficiency) - functioning (efficient-inefficient) (Toboso & Guzmán; Toboso & Guzmán, 2010).

Both the organic ideal and the functional ideal, constructed from the norm, are inscribed and have their interconnection in the body, which takes the place and practice of the medical-ableist discourse, which incorporates the representations and practices that at an organic and functional level participate in the production of the normative body respectively (Toboso and Guzman, 2009) (Toboso and Guzmán, 2010).

From a "medical gaze", bodies are classified according to the health standard, disciplining those who deviate from it so that they are as close as possible to the organic ideal. Under the "able-bodied gaze", able-bodied precedes functionality in terms of importance, so it does not consider different functionalities as different expressions of possible functioning that are truly functional (Toboso and Guzmán, 2010). In other words, able-bodied is equal to majority functionality and thus each (socially legitimized) majority functionality is identified with the corresponding capacity. In this way, and since the set of capabilities configures the normative body, it is configured from the legitimate functionalities. Therefore, the "medical" and "able-bodied" gaze produce a normative, ideal and uniquely possible body, despite the presence of other different bodies that are not considered relevant, since the normative body cancels out other alternatives and makes them invisible.

Both the "medical gaze" (projected onto the organism), and the "able-bodied gaze" (on the functioning), are performative; in other words, they act in the production of the normative body. For example, each conflict with an environmental barrier implies a performative act that reproduces the category of disability and operates on the body which is considered illegitimate, materializing in the normative contents of the medical-ableist discourses regarding the body, as well as reminding it of its "abnormality" for not being able to inhabit that space (Abbott, 2010). These performative acts produce and reproduce the social distance between the normative body and other bodies, the central position of the first and the peripheral position of the others (the abnormal, disabled bodies).

In spite of the progress made during the seventies decade to consider disability a result of social restrictions caused by a hostile environment full of social and environmental barriers (Oliver, 1998), the deficiency at the organic level remains naturalized, conceived and represented as a lack or absence of normality. This deficiency is linked to the body, a body without culture, pre-social and without capacity for action, still an object of medical-ableist discourse. It is precisely this abnormality that continues to anchor this body in the space of the other, perpetuating in a culture of a dividing line between the organically and functionally normative body (the "abled" body, which is viewed as universal and positive) and the disabled body (designated with restrictive criteria), giving rise to these other bodies being marked, their experiences invisible and their existence marked as "other" (deviant and inferior), their differences being construed in terms of absence and negation (Young, 2000). In other words, "the normality of the abled bodies" is inserted into any thought and behavior as a privilege or desirable state of being (and) the notion of a abled body assumes normative or universal standards through which the other bodies are judged" (Palacios, 2008, p. 173).

Undoing the binomial deficiency-disability requires questioning the notion of deficiency as a biological basis, since as long as the assumption of deviation from the norm is considered "natural", the basis of disability will remain unchanged and will remain as negative (Pié, 2010) (Ferreira, 2010) (Toboso and Guzmán, 2010) (Ferreira, 2009c). Recognizing that not only capacity as functional efficiency is socially constructed, but health as organic efficiency also depends on the social context, on a *habitus* or an arbitrary but dominant characteristic that became standard, leads us to think the relationship between bodies, no longer as deterministic (in natural or biological terms), but as a social construction that, in turn, is installed among other

socially constructed and interrelated categories (Toboso and Guzmán, 2009). This system of interrelations will be projected on each particular body, which will no longer be seen as a mere object of discourse (medical-ableist) that disciplines or regulates so as to understand that it occupies the place that obviously corresponds to the normal and natural.

2.4. *The crip experience*

With the *crip* movement, the deviant, diseased and abject body, which was hypercorporalized for not resembling the norm and stigmatized by the trait that deviates from it (Pié, 2009) (Planella, 2006) (Allué, 2003), stops being the object of the medical-ableist discourse to become a subject of resistance. It is the crippled body, which, from the points of rupture of the medical-ableist discourse, becomes a political power and, therefore, the possibility of creating new forms of subjectivation.

The *crips*, in this way, name the processes by which bodies are thought to be deviant, abject, or abnormal; because, far from being innate, the deviation or anomaly is constituted through repeated exclusions through performative acts⁴. But in these acts, in these repetitions, as Abbott (2010) puts it, there is not only oppression but also the possibility of resistance that is found in the instability of this repetition and that is possible to discover by naming the forces of normalization and exposing experiences in order to break them up. For this reason, the *crips* consider their own bodies as carriers of transformation methods, because through embodied experiences they react to the devaluations of the norm, turning towards the body as a place of knowledge, instead of the categories that seek to name it or the mechanisms that try to discipline it (Abbott, 2010).

Embodied experiences represent the points of rupture of the medical-ableist discourse. Turning one's experience into an object of political controversy allows one to control what affects the daily life of corporality, to turn it into a political discussion (Rodríguez, 2010). Therefore, in order to make embodied experiences political practices of dissident subjectivation (Preciado, 2013) allowed the deconstruction of the normative from the corporality, taking control of bodies and producing subjectivity, which, consequently, implies a new way of existing in the world. In other words being the body of the world (Pié, 2013).

Precisely, the incarnate experience that generates a dissenting subjectivation of the norm is the one that the *crip* bodies possess and that has been silenced. The power of resistance that this experience implies in another body is a response to the organic and functional norm. It is from this experience that the *crip* bodies have been taken over to carry out dissident practices that undo the deficiency-disability binomial, denaturing these categories and exposing the vulnerability and interdependence of every human being.

⁴ Companies design norms that regulate subjects and these norms need to be constantly repeated and reiterated in order to materialize. But the bodies do not ever completely conform, with that imposed norm. Therefore, the need to be permanently cited so that they can exert their effects. These norms also give space for the production of bodies that do not conform, because they strengthen the boundary or the frontier precisely, which is why they are indispensable to the norm (Louro, 2001) (following Butler's theory of performativity).

Dependence, a dimension that characterizes human beings in their social organization, its functioning and development, was accepted as a negative aspect of autonomy (Pié, 2012). In the category of dependency, the "others" were positioned, so too were the nonhumans, the imperfect ones, forgetting about the dependent and interdependent character of the human being. Thus, the modern subject was considered autonomous (and even independent –an idea without which liberal economics and politics could not function-) denying their need for others and the environment to live. Although other discourses have reached this same conclusion, the path that the *crip* movement has followed is original for approaching this rupture with the autonomy from the bodily plane.

In the same way that it was confirmed that human being perfection was only an ideal, a norm that did not contain the human being in its animality, finitude and imperfection, it becomes evident that the notion of dependence is particular to human beings and requires that you do not avoid it but rather inscribe it in the same definition as a human being (Planella, 2013). The problem is, therefore, the restrictive use and application of the concept of dependence on certain individuals, and from the outside too, instead of attending to the interdependent character of the human being in general. Likewise, accepting the vulnerability of each human being which allows it to relate with others, showing its radical and ontologically interdependent character (Abbott, 2010).

3. FOR A CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE

The *crip* movement, with its criticism, undoes the disability-deficiency-dependency equation in a similar way as the *queer* and transfeminists undid the gender-sex-sexuality equation. In both cases by showing the constructed and unnatural characters of each of both links in particular and the two chains or equations in general. In addition, showing the ideal that inspired both constructions: the identity in the *queer* case and the autonomy in the *crip* movement. In the first case to discover-build a social space crossed by fuzziness, hybridizations and transversalities, in the second to discover-build a space populated by infinity of interdependencies⁵. In this sense, taking into account Nancy (1992) is fundamental because it reminds us that the being entrusted with philosophy is, in fact, the body. But not an isolated body, instead it is exposed to contact, a loan (our philosopher has a "borrowed" heart)⁶. In short, a populist and multitudinous body. So, in the *queer* scenario the identity disappears and in the *crip* theory the autonomy is disintegrated. But beyond the *queer* and the *crip* worlds, their political and intellectual gestures allow us to see that in terms of soul, identity (deconstructed by the transfeminism and the *queer* movement in respect of sex and gender) or culture, as in the "corporeal" (in this field there are no terms comparable to "identity" and "culture") the units and sets disappear at any scale and there are flows, vectors and escape movements.

But there is another important help to this. In order to deal with the problems posed by identity, the *queer* movement discovered the body, worked with it, but

⁵ It is therefore through these manifestations that the norm and dichotomies are diluted and, as Young (2000, p. 249) expressed, it becomes possible to end discriminatory cultural practices by "inciting all subjects to an understanding of themselves as plural, heterogeneous."

⁶ For this "populist" body it would be necessary to write inseparable from the body but also "populating", as suggested by De Peretti (2005, pp 70-76).

returned to the subtle or immaterial plan in which the identity was lodged, although this time with hybridizations and transversality. The gesture is interesting but imperfect because it does not allow an exit to the circle in which the Western Culture was introduced to when it decided to consider the soul superior to the body and, finally, to exclude it from its reflection and from politics. We know that, at least since the Seventeenth century, many important thoughts and thinkers have privileged the body and the material against the theologically-oriented postulates of the time, and from them most of the common-sense understanding of the "naturalist" Western stance has its origin. However, we also know that all these gestures haven't been hard enough in order to change the inertial path of the Western Culture thought about soul as an immaterial reality and body as a material part of the world. Fortunately, the *crip* gesture completes the *queer* gesture forcing it to enter fully into the field of the body. The problem here is that, in the absence of a tradition of reflective and political dealings with it, everything is yet to be done. Precisely what we will try to do in this second part of this article is to prove it.

3.1. *Our body rotation and the Chinese gesture*

It is true that within the sciences (hard and soft), as well as in the field of philosophy, there are interesting contributions with which to feed the body turn. This is the case, for example, of the *embodiment* paradigm used by Brooks (2018) to build his robots, since they learn and develop without using a system of representations or "reason" at all, but by simply incarnating and self-organizing from the disturbances by which they are affected. In much the same way, the second Wittgenstein (1988, pp. 23-30) pointed out that when he proposed the expression "language game" to refer to the fact that the sense or use given by speakers to language is more important than the meaning. Subsequently, Austin (Levinson, 1989: pp. 219-227) went deeper into the open road for the Austrian by noting that the question of whether certain statements are true or false is less important than the fact that they are useful. This statement was made when he discovered that certain declarative sentences are made not only with the intention of saying something but also doing things. He called these kinds of prayers "performative", which also include among others promising, threatening, ordering ones, etc. He later decided to use another distinction: "locutive" acts which are the classic declaratives (that are referenced), "illocutionary" acts which are related to the force associated with saying things, and "perlocutive" acts which refer to the effects of what is said⁸.

Finally, in his last works, the ill-fated Varela (1990) paid attention to a way of knowing called "enacting", that connects with the European phenomenological tradition⁹. In his view knowledge can only be understood as embodied or personified

⁸ Although in principle they are different, there are other lines of research that deviate from the spiritualism that has dominated the reflection on language. This is the case of the recovery of writing and the trace that Derrida makes (1986) against phonocentrism (in alliance with the logocentrism) that has dominated in the reflection from the Stoics to Saussure. It is also the recovery of the field of demonstration that, in the face of the symbolic, Bühler recovery (1985) and closer to us that which has maintained and enriched García Calvo (1991). Neither should we forget McLuhan's (1985) denunciation of visual hyperesthesia that is behind our experience of language and writing, which has sacrificed the synesthetic confluence of more senses, as with hieroglyphic writing.

⁹ To position the work of Varela in the wide range of authors influenced by the neurosciences and dedicated to the study of the conscience, see Chalmers (1995)

in the being- that is living, so it is sensitive to its existential conditions, so each cognitive act is unique. And that in our daily life we chain different modes of knowledge-action or "micro-identities" as we move from a "micro-world" or situation to others.

Although previous and other paths that we leave in the inkwell are useful, it is also possible to make a more radical and decisive gesture and to be inspired by other cultures that always put corporality at the center. This gesture is necessary because, from its origins, the dominant thought in the West put the soul ahead and despised the body. Hence the idea that the face is the mirror of the soul, that the appearance has to do with contentment, that a healthy body is related to a healthy mind, that the phenomenonic allows the access to the noumenon, etc. These and other similar observations are based on a set of distinctions and basic hierarchies (interior/exterior, deep/superficial, essential/accessorial, etc.) in which the first terms have a spiritual or immaterial character and are considered superior to corporal character and material to the second. Such distinctions have brought with them artistic, intellectual, religious bets etc. Concerned also with what is considered deep-inner-essential to the detriment of what is evaluated as outer-surface-accessories.

The curious thing is that this has happened even when art has stripped the body of clothes and has shown it naked, both in Greece to represent beauty and in Christian iconography to symbolize the good and true (Jullien, 2004). The problem is that the bodies thus exposed were absorbed by the ideas (beauty, truth, goodness) they represented and to facilitate that bond they had to be deserted. It is as if in the West there had been some discomfort with the excess of soul, which was then compensated by reintroducing the body, but only as a mirror of that one and being, and therefore, less "corporal". Instead, in China, they have never sought beauty, goodness and truth in nudity. When such a body type has appeared, it has done so not to show beauty but sexuality. And as for its level of beauty, it has preferred to dwell on the details, the folds and the sinuosity of appearance.

We are therefore faced with different aesthetic corporalities. While the West breaks up the world into ideas and subordinates corporality to them, the Chinese breaks up the body and brings the subtle world of ideas to it. This not only happens in the field of art, because in Eastern medicine very poetic terms are used to deal with corporalities (Kuriyama, 2005). Thus, a "slippery" pulse is associated with a "succession of rolling beads", a "rough" pulse has to do with "wet sand" and Li Zhongzi, a Chinese medicine classic, said of the "floating" pulse that it is like a breeze blowing through the lungs of a bird's back, silent and whispering like the fall of the leaves of the elms, like wood floating in the water, like layers of onion coiled slightly between the fingers" (P.105). In addition to anatomy itself, the body has been seen and interpreted in a poetic way.

When the Chinese decided to open it and dissect it, a practice that was much less common than among the Greeks, they did not see the muscles and nerves that the Mediterraneans considered striking, but the "blossoming of tonalities" (p.197), an expression that they used to designate the flows of humors that circulate according to complex but precise coordinates.

3.2. Humans and non-humans

However, we will not use Chinese culture to look at ourselves in that mirror and instead look for some inspiration with which to develop the body desire that first of all the *queer* and then later the *crip* movement, among others¹⁰, have placed before the eyes of our civilization to take care of. Because of its originality, we prefer to pay attention to the powerful and elaborate centrality of the body discovered by Viveiros de Castro (2006; 2010; 2013) among Native American Indians, made more explicit by the contrast between humans and non-humans, very different to that instituted by Western civilization. But in order to facilitate the comparison of both systems of differences, it is convenient to inscribe them in the broader field proposed by Descola (2006, pp. 169-176), due to the fact that it should not include not only what anthropology has discovered among Native American Indians, but also what social science has seen among Africans, Australians and Orientals.

The French anthropologist says that every human is perceived as a mixed unity of interiority and physicality from which he recognizes or denies the other non-human characteristics derived from his own. In fact, in contrast to a non-human, one can assume that he possesses elements of physicality and interiority identical to mine (as happens with Australian totemism) or different ones (as with Oriental analogism). One can also assume that we have similar interiorities and different physicalisms (such as Native American Indian animism) or different interiorities and analogous physicalisms (as happens with our naturalism). These four "ontologies" (according to Descola's expression) give rise to natural contracts between different humans and non-humans.

Going straight to the point, we can say that while the scientific naturalism of our world understands that humans, in addition to nonhumans are physically very similar and that this similarity can be portrayed in objective terms by science (for example, our DNA and that of the vinegar fly are practically identical, the hearts of pigs and animals are interchangeable, which makes it easy to use them as valves for our hearts, etc.), the animism of the Native American Indian understands that the human among us and the Non-human are physically very different and from these differences emerge very different and even immeasurable ways of knowledge. From this it follows that for the average westerner there is a plurality of human cultures. Against a nature that has a rather uniform character, Native American Indians propose the opposite: a unique culture with multiple natures. And if Westerners have invented "cultural relativism" and "multiculturalism" to know how to coexist with human diversity, the Native American Indians have developed a "multinaturalism" with their "perspectivism". A (natural) perspective is the opposite of a (cultural) representation because the representations are attributes of the spirits whereas the perspectives

¹⁰ We should not forget, for example, the aggressive body aesthetics that have gone from tattooing to scratching, brandings (burning), the introduction of prothesis (horns, scales, etc.), amputation (phalanges) (Cheeks), bifid tongues, etc. (Rojo Ojados, 2014). Nor should we forget Fitness and Health, which began in the 1970s but originated in the 1940s, when the army decided to improve the quality of its recruits (Howell and Ingham, 2001: 335). Sloterdijk (2012) says that "exercise" in the twenty-first century (a substitute for the "reflexivity" that dominated the twentieth century and the "production" that it championed in the nineteenth century) is a type of "antropotécnica" of different cultures that have tried to optimize to avoid the risks of life and the certainties of death (Sloterdijk, 2012, p.24). One consequence of this is, according to Sloterdijk, the appearance of "neo-athletics", inaugurated by the Olympism of Pierre De Coubertín. With it, the "religion of hunger" disappears and "satiety and fitness" appears (Sloterdijk, 2012, pp. 117-118).

express points of view of the bodies. That is why animals and humans see different worlds¹¹.

Another important difference that Viveiros de Castro points out between Westerners and Native American Indians has to do with the fact that our ontology postulates a human-animal physical continuity and also a discontinuity between the two sides as far as the soul is concerned, while the Native American Indians suppose that humans and non-humans have a relationship of continuity as far as the soul is concerned (since we both share the same humanity) but our bodies are different. This is why, on the esoteric level, the shamanism practices the bodily metamorphosis (the spirit remains but the forms or bodies change) while among us spiritual possession is more usual (the form or body is maintained but the spirits change). This is because for them the body is a means to reach the spirit, while for us it is impossible because the bodies are sealed and armored.

But beyond esotericism, for the West the problem is not so much the connections and corporeal continuities but how to unite those souls that we consider completely separate from each other. To solve this, we have constructed gigantic intellectual buildings that justify the collective from such things as the "social contract", the "Oedipus complex", "symbolic", etc. In contrast to the Native American Indians, as we have seen, there is no distinction of souls, the self is not so clear as to what it is and is even in constant danger because it could be perceived in very different ways (by the wild boar, the jaguar, etc.) So there is an excess of communication, which makes it necessary to listen very carefully so as to understand and follow and in the same way it is necessary to establish breaks, to separate, to generate separations, a practice which is absolutely contrary to the one of generating conjunctions that we use in the West and that explains the importance that devices with important homogenizing functions have among us such as education, hyperspecialized in the conduction of souls towards a common cultural place. The Native American Indians, on the other hand, as their problem was communication of bodies have an "education" that tries to put them in common. That is why they say to anthropologists: it is necessary to eat our food or sleep with our women so that to understand our language.

So, while for us education is spiritual, for the Native American Indians it implies a corporal discipline¹². The existence of cannibalism makes a lot of sense from this point of view. As for their intellectual concerns, they have little to do with ours. For example, in the sixteenth century the Spaniards who came to America doubted that the Indians had souls and were therefore human, just in the same way at that time, unlike nowadays, they doubted that women, black people or animals had souls and were human. For this they sent commissions of theologians. At the same time the

¹¹ By the way, Maturana (1995) elaborated his constructivist point of view and his own notion of autopoiesis, central in certain sociology, from his studies on the different vision systems of living beings (pigeons are tetrachromatic, we are trichromatic; there are species that see below the red and others above the violet, etc.). He concluded that each system is embodied in different bodies and lifestyles for which such views are functional. This is a perspectivist constructivism very different from the one proposed in multiculturalism, because the latter case is based on internal differences (different subjectivities and cultures), while the other is interested in the body characteristics and the context in which these bodies develop.

¹² In our world, popular culture has always maintained a deal with the materiality of the body that is in the antipodes of the one cultivated by the elites, as shown by Bajtin (1990) and who have continued

Indians immersed the corpses of the Spaniards to see if their body was corrupted or not. The Spaniards doubted whether the Indians were human or animal, while the Indians doubted whether the Spaniards were humans or spirits. Some were questioned by the presence or not of the soul, while others did so due to the materialism of the body. They both wanted to know about each other's humanity but in different ways. Another important difference that is inferred from Viveiros De Castro's model refers to fashion or personal aesthetics, more precisely to the component of transgression that incorporates, since the disguise allows both them and us to be another. In general, they transgress with their imitations of other bodies (animals) the distinction of bodies in which they are settled. In fact, Native American Indian "fashions" have the function of producing truly human bodies with pieces of animal bodies (feathers, teeth, furs, etc.), so they differ by playing on the danger of human-animal confusion, which is so dangerous for them. From this danger they extract their particular aesthetic pleasure. We, however, transgress with our identifications with other (human) people the difference of (sub) cultures in which we are based¹³. In fact, we humanize ourselves aesthetically by playing with the confusion of essences, more precisely trying to imitate classes, ages, genres, ethnicities, etc. that we are not. From this danger (the elimination of the essential differences) we extract our particular aesthetic pleasure. In both cases the poison, properly dosed, and enriches the system instead of destroying it. In short, for them the other animal bodies are their solution, for us other human cultures are our solution. In the first case not to fall into essential or deep indistinctiveness and in the second to avoid falling into material or superficial indistinctiveness.

Finally, let us use the point of view applied here to understand from another angle the problems of two important institutions in our world: science and politics. In the West, within science, as the world of ideas has become hegemonic, the Native American Indians point of view that we no longer have (although it is present in ordinary life and in certain traditions and rural activities such as livestock and hunting) it has been able to survive only through "corporal" appropriations. Such is the conclusion that can be drawn from Lizcano's reflections on the already forgotten physical or corporeal metaphors that originated our most common mathematical notions and whose (perspectivist) traces still remain in language (Lizcano, 1993; Lizcano, 2006)

For example, the so-called "square root" operation shows that in Greek, Roman, and medieval imagery the number was perceived as a plant. Analyzing the texts of a Portuguese mathematician of the Renaissance (Pero Nuns) and his continuous reference to different types of roots, Lizcano suggests that a similarity between a geometric field (in which there are objects like sides and squares) and a biological one (one that has roots). In other words, the relationship of one side with its square is the same as there is between a root and its plant. So, the side engenders, nourishes and feeds the square until it makes its own space in the same way that the root does with the plant.

From the recognition of certain imaginary substrata that are inspired by particular bodily or material experiences and give rise to certain abstract concepts such as those used by our mathematics, it is possible to suppose that other bodily

¹³ Different theories of fashions underline the imitation that some groups or classes perform on others. See, for example, Simmel (1927)

influences may give rise to other mathematics. In this sense, we must take into account that our mathematics are activated from the pre-eminence of visual sense, which for other cultures is not so important. Thus, for the *ongee* of the Andaman Islands in the South Pacific life is ruled by smell and to identify oneself the nose is used. On the other hand, the Mexican *tzotils* cite their existence in the heat. Other societies, such as the *desana* of the Colombian Amazon give importance to vision, but not to the Greek vision that outlines contours and delimits figures, but to another one that pays attention to colors and chromatic synesthesia¹⁴.

These observations by Lizcano show that under the apparent objectivity of science there is a perspective relativism. Such relativism does not depend on the interiorities (soul, culture, etc.), as other sociologies and philosophies of science stress (Iranzo & Blanco, 1999), but also on exteriorities (bodies, contexts, etc.). Lizcano's work is not easy to assimilate because it reveals that the abstractions of science, that reflexivity so respected in our time, are not objective or independent of context, as confessed, but, on the contrary, is constructed by erasing the corporeal or situational metaphors on which it is based. In the social sciences, the opposite is true, since it is a question of making such corporeal, situational influences patent. And to build theories that manifest them¹⁵. In fact, what makes the critical vector of social science (quite influential and in some times and domains also dominant) in front of the positivist vector is precisely this¹⁶.

So, we propose to call this modality of science perspectivist, which sometimes hides (in the case of certain hard sciences) and other times shows (case of certain social sciences) those material influences that, from a perspectivist point of view, always intervene. On the other side is the naturalistic point of view, which is sometimes hidden (in the case of certain social sciences) and others demonstrate (in the case of certain hard sciences) the influence of context, body and situation. In other words, the hard sciences tend to conceal a material influence that can only be discovered through suspicion, a basic intellectual resource on the other side, while the social sciences tend to exhibit an inner influence (cultural, personal, etc.). .) That can only be appeased by the establishment of protocols, methods and theories similar to those of the hard sciences.

If we move on from the field of sciences, whether hard or soft, to that of politics, we find ourselves in a similar situation. On the one hand, certain policies, just as dominant as the hard sciences (which exhibit the objective character of an idealistic abstraction), place arbitrary precedents such as freedom, equality or fraternity, always ideal even if they are hierarchized in different ways in each ideological field. On the other hand, different policies, with more kinship with the soft or social sciences, place bodies, situations and contexts at the front. A good political field in which to show this perspectivist influence is precisely the one formed by the different feminisms and *queer* or *crip* positions, which cannot be understood if it is not from the incarnation or

¹⁴ Within our world Sacks (1997) discovered a landscape of representations of the world just as extraordinary and also corporately rooted in its treatment of a wide range of neurological diseases that, however, do not make life much harder for those who suffer from them

¹⁵ For example see Bourdieu (1997)

¹⁶ The so-called philosophy of suspicion (Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche) would be a permanent source of inspiration for a multitude of theories and methodologies, from the Frankfurt School to Bourdieu via Foucault and the many families of psychoanalysts. To discover how these theories require specific research methodologies see Bergua (2011, pp. 45-55)

embodiment of each (scientific) or practical (political) discourse in their respective body, context and situation¹⁷.

4.DISCUSSION

The *queer* and *crip* movements are post-humanists because they deconstruct the normalized subject by different flanks on which a certain idea of humanity rests and opens the possibility of constructing different subjects.

The *queer* movement was born in a context of discussion among homosexuals about the identity in which the gender-sex-sexuality sequence is dismantled, confirming the socially constructed character of each link as well as the very logic of the chain that had initiated feminism from Beauvoir and suggesting the building of both new links and other logics. A consequence of the deconstructions and constructions carried out is the overflow of the field of identity that was initially worked on and the landing in the diffuse and blurred world of the hybridizations. From our point of view, however, the importance that the *queer* movement has ended up bestowing on the body is much more valuable. The problem is that they have not considered it in all its extension and complexity, since the only one they mention is the sexual one¹⁸.

The *crip* movement, although born in a context of discussion about the autonomy of the disabled, is greatly influenced by the discovery of the body that the *queer* performs. Its main merit is to have dismantled the disability-deficiency-dependency scheme after discovering its socially constructed character, suggesting the construction of other links and deploying other logics. Another of its contributions is the overflow that impels the notion of autonomy and the stake for interdependence. However, the most important thing from our point of view is its decided landing in corporeality. The problem is that our civilization does not have the necessary habitus to deploy it. In addition, although functional differences amplify corporality more than sexuality does, it still leaves large numbers of body dimensions unattended.

In relation to this problem, the powerful and elaborate centrality of the body discovered by Viveiros de Castro among the Native American Indians, gives us a perspectivist hint to attend to. Unlike what western civilization understands, for

¹⁷ But not all other alterities have developed a discourse and activated their own political practices. This is the case, for example, of young people, adolescents or children. If they had done so, it would have been necessary for them to be conceived as subjects. They have not done so because they could not consider that possibility or because it did not interest them. For both reasons they show a different alterity to that exhibited by groups as mobilized as the *crip* or *queer*. Aside from this, to see the politics produced by Native American Indians animism and other similar peoples, (De La Cadena & Starn (2007).

¹⁸ Foucault (1980) says that the West suffers from an atavistic and structural blockade of sexuality. While the East has created an *ars erotica* to develop and intensify its experience (Kamasutra case), our civilization has blocked it by the procedure (from using the device of confession in Christianity to psychoanalysis afterwards) to speak it or put it into discourse, creating therefore a *scientia sexualis*. The *queer* movement seems to have overcome this resistance. Although it seems contradictory, the atavistic resistance to accept sexuality is also behind the compulsive awakening that has occurred since the 1960s with sexual revolutions (Reich, 1980), the consideration that sexuality improves existence (and even has a divine character) and the explosion of disciplines and practices related to all this. A good example of these words spoken in the heat of the Sexual Revolution were: "Man can only desire the pleasure of woman, that God who slumbers in her and never produces in her body, can only observe it with astonishment, Panic, terror ... "(Bruckner & Fikielkraut, 1989, p 40).

human and non-human Native American Indians we share the same (human) interiority but our bodies are differentiated. Therefore, unlike in the West, the main problem is the communication among bodies and, consequently, trying to find something in common. The Native American Indians view opens the possibility of deconstructing the centrality of the human species that is at the base of our civilization and consider from that gesture other points of view about itself. Both movements are part of the same post-anthropocentric change.

While for Western scientific naturalism there are hardly any physical differences between humans and nonhumans (as opposed to the plurality of human cultures they consider that there is uniform nature), Native American Indian perspectivism speaks of multiple natures versus a single culture. From both matrices spring different modes of knowledge. That is why, in the West, cultural relativism and multiculturalism have been invented to coexist with multiple human cultures, the Native American Indians have developed, with their perspectivism, a multinaturalism that is the opposite of a (cultural) representation, since perspectives express points of views of the bodies.

In the West within science, such perspectivism has only been able to survive through corporal appropriations. In the light of Lizcano's observations about how corporeal or material experiences have given rise to abstract concepts such as those used by our mathematics, it is shown that, under the apparent objectivity of science, there is a perspectivist relativism. Such relativism does not depend on interiorities (soul, culture, etc.), but on exteriorities (bodies, contexts, etc.). It is therefore revealed that the abstractions of science are not objective or independent of context, as it confesses itself, but, on the contrary, and as most critical social sciences show, they are constructed by erasing or forgetting the physical metaphors or situational issues on which it is based. We propose, therefore, apart from what is mentioned above, to denominate perspectivist to the modality of science that makes those material influences manifest and that, from a perspectivist point of view, always and inevitably intervene.

If we move from the field of science to that of politics we find ourselves in a similar situation. In general, political conversations give obvious abstractions such as the individual, the nation, freedom, equality, etc. Valid for any context or situation. However, certain critical policies use notions (eg, the "class" of Marxists and the "gender" of feminists) that put the situations or contexts that produce them at the front. A good political field in which to show this perspectivist influence is precisely the one formed by *queer* or *crip* positions, which cannot be understood except from the corporeality that each (scientific) or practical (political) discourse confesses to embody.

We believe that the post-Anthropocentric changes considered, although important in themselves, also have the merit of providing coverage and giving impetus to the determined encounter with the body that leads to the post-humanism *crip*. Our intention is to work on this issue in the future.

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