88216 20230126102836.0 doi 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.02.015 sideral 111276 ART-2019-111276 eng Garcia-Mainar, I. Universidad de Zaragoza (orcid)0000-0003-2503-2829 The signalling role of over-education and qualifications mismatch 2019 Access copy available to the general public Unrestricted Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal. info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/S13 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/UZ/UZ2015-SOC-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess All rights reserved http://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/ 1.486 2019 ECONOMICS 177 / 371 = 0.477 2019 Q2 T2 0.979 2019 Economics and Econometrics 2019 Q2 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Montuenga, V.M. Universidad de Zaragoza (orcid)0000-0003-2893-4051 4000 415 Universidad de Zaragoza Dpto. Análisis Económico Área Fund. Análisis Económico 41, 1 (2019), 99-119 J. policy model. JOURNAL OF POLICY MODELING 0161-8938 532986 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/88216/files/texto_completo.pdf Postprint 174817 http://zaguan.unizar.es/record/88216/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon icon Postprint oai:zaguan.unizar.es:88216 articulos driver 2023-01-26-09:53:32 ARTICLE