000095749 001__ 95749 000095749 005__ 20210902121817.0 000095749 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1038/s41598-020-71664-w 000095749 0248_ $$2sideral$$a120186 000095749 037__ $$aART-2020-120186 000095749 041__ $$aeng 000095749 100__ $$aLozano, P. 000095749 245__ $$aCooperation, social norm internalization, and hierarchical societies 000095749 260__ $$c2020 000095749 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000095749 5203_ $$aMany animal and human societies exhibit hierarchical structures with different degrees of steepness. Some of these societies also show cooperative behavior, where cooperation means working together for a common benefit. However, there is an increasing evidence that rigidly enforced hierarchies lead to a decrease of cooperation in both human and non-human primates. In this work, we address this issue by means of an evolutionary agent-based model that incorporates fights as social interactions governing a dynamic ranking, communal work to produce a public good, and norm internalization, i.e. a process where acting according to a norm becomes a goal in itself. Our model also includes the perception of how much the individual is going to retain from her cooperative behavior in future interactions. The predictions of the model resemble the principal characteristics of human societies. When ranking is unconstrained, we observe a high concentration of agents in low scores, while a few ones climb up the social hierarchy and exploit the rest, with no norm internalization. If ranking is constrained, thus leading to bounded score differences between agents, individual positions in the ranking change more, and the typical structure shows a division of the society in upper and lower classes. In this case, we observe that there is a significant degree of norm internalization, supporting large fractions of the population cooperating in spite of the rank differences. Our main results are robust with respect to the model parameters and to the type of rank constraint. We thus provide a mechanism that can explain how hierarchy arises in initially egalitarian societies while keeping a large degree of cooperation. 000095749 536__ $$9info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MCIU-FEDER/PGC2018-098186-B-I00 000095749 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aby$$uhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ 000095749 590__ $$a4.379$$b2020 000095749 591__ $$aMULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES$$b17 / 73 = 0.233$$c2020$$dQ1$$eT1 000095749 592__ $$a1.24$$b2020 000095749 593__ $$aMultidisciplinary$$c2020$$dQ1 000095749 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 000095749 700__ $$aGavrilets, S. 000095749 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-1874-2881$$aSánchez, A. 000095749 773__ $$g10, 1 (2020), 15359$$pSci. rep.$$tScientific Reports$$x2045-2322 000095749 8564_ $$s4243636$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/95749/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yVersión publicada 000095749 8564_ $$s361880$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/95749/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yVersión publicada 000095749 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:95749$$particulos$$pdriver 000095749 951__ $$a2021-09-02-10:05:31 000095749 980__ $$aARTICLE