000097273 001__ 97273 000097273 005__ 20210902121610.0 000097273 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1007/s00191-019-00645-8 000097273 0248_ $$2sideral$$a115322 000097273 037__ $$aART-2020-115322 000097273 041__ $$aeng 000097273 100__ $$0(orcid)0000-0003-3766-9157$$aAlmudí, Isabel$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000097273 245__ $$aPricing routines and industrial dynamics 000097273 260__ $$c2020 000097273 5060_ $$aAccess copy available to the general public$$fUnrestricted 000097273 5203_ $$aWe propose an evolutionary model in which boundedly rational firms compete and learn in a dynamic oligopoly with imperfect information and evolving degrees of market power. Firms in the model set prices according to routines, and try to make profits by capturing market share. The model can be extended to deal with heterogeneous costs and technological advance. The demand side of the market is composed of boundedly rational consumers who are capable of adapting to changing market options. Supply-demand interactions can be represented through a population dynamics model from which prices and market structures emerge. We obtain closed-form and simulation results which we interpret and compare with benchmark results from a standard non-cooperative game (Bertrand). When we compare the results with the Bertrand setting, we find a surprising result. Whereas in the fully rational Bertrand setting, firms either lower prices and erode their extra profits, or try to cooperate in a collusive equilibrium that is detrimental for consumer welfare, in the evolutionary setting firms make substantial profits, compete by adjusting prices, and the dynamics improve consumer welfare. From these results we claim that, instead of treating market power, externalities, and asymmetric information as market failures, we should consider them as essential traits of market competition. We argue that neo-Schumpeterian models incorporate all of these features together, thus leading towards a more realistic price theory for market economies. 000097273 540__ $$9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess$$aAll rights reserved$$uhttp://www.europeana.eu/rights/rr-f/ 000097273 590__ $$a2.343$$b2020 000097273 591__ $$aECONOMICS$$b140 / 376 = 0.372$$c2020$$dQ2$$eT2 000097273 592__ $$a0.767$$b2020 000097273 593__ $$aEconomics and Econometrics$$c2020$$dQ1 000097273 593__ $$aBusiness, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)$$c2020$$dQ1 000097273 655_4 $$ainfo:eu-repo/semantics/article$$vinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 000097273 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0002-1246-6751$$aFatás Villafranca, Francisco$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000097273 700__ $$aPalacio, Jesús 000097273 700__ $$0(orcid)0000-0001-9521-4156$$aSánchez Chóliz, Julio$$uUniversidad de Zaragoza 000097273 7102_ $$14000$$2415$$aUniversidad de Zaragoza$$bDpto. Análisis Económico$$cÁrea Fund. Análisis Económico 000097273 773__ $$g30, 3 (2020), 705–739$$pJ. evol. econ.$$tJOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS$$x0936-9937 000097273 8564_ $$s556143$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/97273/files/texto_completo.pdf$$yPostprint 000097273 8564_ $$s305927$$uhttps://zaguan.unizar.es/record/97273/files/texto_completo.jpg?subformat=icon$$xicon$$yPostprint 000097273 909CO $$ooai:zaguan.unizar.es:97273$$particulos$$pdriver 000097273 951__ $$a2021-09-02-08:40:25 000097273 980__ $$aARTICLE