On the dynamic stability of the Cournot duopoly solution under bounded rationality
Resumen: The most of the oligopolistic models described in the existing literature analyze dynamic processes and the stability of the Nash equilibrium by introducing concrete specifications for the demand and the cost functions. This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the context of a duopoly using general functions to establish both demand and costs. The condition that guarantees the stability of the Nash equilibrium under the adjustment process implicit in the Cournot’s original model is found to be a key requirement underpinning the dynamic stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium regardless of the firms’ expectations scheme. Moreover, this condition is more decisive the higher the degree of rationality of firms.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.24309/recta.2021.22.1.04
Año: 2022
Publicado en: Rect@. Revista electrónica de comunicaciones y trabajos de ASEPUMA 22 (2022), 51-62
ISSN: 1575-605X

Factor impacto CITESCORE: 0.3 - Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Q4) - Mathematics (Q4)

Factor impacto SCIMAGO: 0.102 - Economics and Econometrics (Q4) - Applied Mathematics (Q4)

Tipo y forma: Article (Published version)
Área (Departamento): Área Fund. Análisis Económico (Dpto. Análisis Económico)

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 Record created 2023-01-26, last modified 2023-09-14


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