Feeling in values: axiological and emotional intentionality as living structure of ethical life, regarding Max Scheler's phenomenology

Velázquez, J. (Universidad de Zaragoza)

Resumen: Some of the contemporary ethical debates have put in value the rational feature of feelings because of the estimative intentionality that is implied in them. In this context, some claim that the intentionality of emotions is a kind of value perception, as Phenomenology stressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly Max Scheler, by analysing emotional Feeling [Fühlen] in the frame of emotional life. In order to extend the context of this philosophical debate, and after describing Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings of the intentional and non-intentional emotional life, firstly, we defend the axiological and emotional intentionality as double intentionality that—in our understanding—Scheler analyses phenomenologically, while taking distance from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s intentional structure of estimative emotions. And, secondly, we propose a tentative interpretation of the link between estimative and emotional double intentionality as living structure of ethical life, in the light of Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Phenomenology.

Idioma: Inglés

DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09656-0

Año: 2023

Publicado en: HUMAN STUDIES 46 (2023), 43–57
ISSN: 0163-8548

Factor impacto JCR: 0.8 (2023)

Categ. JCR: ETHICS rank: 57 / 77 = 0.74 (2023) - Q3 - T3
Categ. JCR: SOCIOLOGY rank: 152 / 217 = 0.7 (2023) - Q3 - T3

Factor impacto CITESCORE: 1.7 - Philosophy (Q1) - Sociology and Political Science (Q2)

Factor impacto SCIMAGO: 0.365 - Philosophy (Q1) - Sociology and Political Science (Q2)

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA/H05-20R

Tipo y forma: Artículo (Versión definitiva)

Área (Departamento): Área Filosofía (Unidad Predepartam. Filosofía)