The monitoring role of pension fund ownership in ESG firm controversies
Resumen: This study examines the role of pension fund ownership as a control mechanism of ESG firm controversies. Institutional investors are traditionally considered passive owners; however, the role of pension funds is not clear because, in theory, they may be effective monitors as pressure-resistant investors. This work analyses the impact of UK equity pension funds on their investee firms’ ESG controversies. The results indicate that a larger pension fund shareholding reduces controversies related to environmental and product responsibility areas. However, pension funds are passive monitors in other areas, such as workforce, to avoid conflicts of interest with company management. Moreover, we first consider the impact of social investment networks on ESG firm controversies, and the findings reveal that pension funds have diverse interests, especially conventional funds, which produces conflicts of interest in the networks. In addition, ambiguous information flows across the networks, leading to different interpretations of the information and thus diverse monitoring decisions regarding ESG firm controversies. Finally, pension fund shareholding encourages some substantive CSR engagement practices in the corporate citizenship area.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.1016/j.bir.2025.10.008
Año: 2025
Publicado en: Borsa Istanbul Review 25, 6 (2025), 1585-1625
ISSN: 2214-8450

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/DGA-FEDER/S38-20R-CIBER
Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MICINN PID2022-136818NB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033
Tipo y forma: Article (Published version)
Área (Departamento): Área Economía Finan. y Contab. (Dpto. Contabilidad y Finanzas)
Exportado de SIDERAL (2026-02-04-13:14:18)


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articulos > articulos-por-area > economia_financiera_y_contabilidad



 Notice créée le 2026-02-04, modifiée le 2026-02-04


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