Optimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matters
Resumen: In this paper, we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially beneficial but costly activities in order to convey information about their willingness to cooperate with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary compensations in any one of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We find the subsidies that maximize social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal subsidies of changes in their determinants.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12369
Año: 2019
Publicado en: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 122 (2019), [24 pp.]
ISSN: 0347-0520

Factor impacto SCIMAGO:

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/MINECO/ECO2016-75631-P
Tipo y forma: Article (PrePrint)
Área (Departamento): Área Fund. Análisis Económico (Dpto. Análisis Económico)

Creative Commons You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. You may not use the material for commercial purposes. If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material.

Exportado de SIDERAL (2019-09-09-15:08:27)

Este artículo se encuentra en las siguientes colecciones:

 Record created 2019-09-09, last modified 2019-09-09

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
(Not yet reviewed)