metascepticism and the traditional epistemological project: Sosa and Stroud on standards of success
Resumen: The exchange between Ernest Sosa and Barry Stroud on the possibility of a theory of knowledge is usually treated as a quarrel about epistemic circularity. I argue that it is better understood as a clash over standards of success for epistemology. On Sosa’s virtue perspectivism, reliability and apt belief fix the aim of epistemology. On Stroud’s view, philosophical success requires first-person accessibility and non-circular understanding. The dispute about circularity is therefore derivative. Drawing on Pérez Chico and Sanfélix’s notion of metascepticism, I propose an operational test that distinguishes genuine reform from metascepticism in the strict sense. The result is a way of classifying positions that clarifies what success in epistemology can coherently amount to.
Idioma: Inglés
DOI: 10.36576/2660-955X.53.231
Año: 2026
Publicado en: Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 53 (2026), 231-245
ISSN: 0210-4857

Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-142120NB-I00
Financiación: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/AEI/AEI PID2022-14892NB-I00
Tipo y forma: Article (Published version)
Área (Departamento): Área Lógica y Filosof.Ciencia (Unidad Predepartam. Filosofía)

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